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CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION: LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS. 
By Josh Chafetz. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017. Pp 449. $45.00  
 
Aziz Z. Huq* 
 
 
Scholarship and jurisprudence concerning the Constitution’s separation of 
powers today is characterized by sharp disagreement about general theory and 
specific outcomes. The leading theories diverge on how to model the motives of 
institutional actors; on how to weigh text, history, doctrine, and norms; and on 
whether to characterize the separation-of-powers system as abiding in a stable 
equilibrium or as enthralled in convulsively transformative paroxysms. 
Congress’s Constitution—a major contribution to theorizing on the separation 
of powers—provides a platform to step back and isolate these important, if not 
always candidly recognized, disputes about the empirical and normative 
predicates of separation-of-powers theory—predicates that can be usefully 
grouped under the rubric of ‘separation of powers metatheory.’ Unlike much 
other work in the field, Congress’s Constitution directly identifies and addresses 
the three important key metatheoretical questions in play when the separation of 
powers is theorized. This review analyzes how it grapples with those profound 
challenges, and tries to articulate a descriptively fit and normatively compelling 
account of our federal government. Considering Congress’s Constitution from 
this perspective offers a valuable opportunity for considering the state and 
direction of academic theorizing on the separation of powers more broadly.  
 
                                                
* Frank and Bernice J. Greenberg Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. Thanks to 
Whittney Barth for terrific research and editing assistance.  
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Scholarship and jurisprudence on the Constitution’s separation of powers1 today 
is characterized by sharp disagreement in respect to general theory well as to specific 
outcomes. One school of scholarly theories emphasizes the categorical separation and 
autonomous functioning of each branch. 2  Another celebrates instead a dynamic 
interaction within and between branches that is said to produce a beneficial checking and 
balancing.3  And a third approach analyzes the optimal assignment of institutional 
authority to a branch based on an extrinsic, non-legal criterion of social welfare 
maximization.4  Other, more retail, contributions on discrete, local questions of law 
abound.  
 
The Supreme Court’s treatment of legislative-executive relationships has also 
“cycled” among various theories since the 1920s, generating an unstable, unpredictable, 
and oft criticized jurisprudence. 5  While these debates have mainly hinged on 
congressional-executive relationships, the other margins of the separation of powers have 
hardly wanted for controversy. The judicial construction of Article III boundaries, for 
                                                
1 The separation of powers comprises bilateral interactions between Congress, the executive, and the 
federal judiciary, in addition to more complex dynamics pairing two branches against one. References to 
the separation of powers are often vague in the sense of failing to specify which of these interactions is 
picked out. This review essay, consistent with the scope of the book under consideration, focuses upon the 
bilateral Congress-executive dynamic.     
2 See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Return of the King, 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1521, 1538 (2015) (“The Constitution, 
however, vests ‘[t]he’ executive power—meaning all of the executive power—in the President. There is no 
executive power remaining to be vested in anyone else.” (citations and footnotes omitted)); Steven G. 
Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1153, 1165-68 (1992) (“Unitary executive theorists read [the Article II Vesting] clause, together 
with the Take Care Clause, as creating a hierarchical, unified executive department under the direct control 
of the President. They conclude that the President alone possesses all of the executive power and that he 
therefore can direct, control, and supervise inferior officers or agencies who seek to exercise discretionary 
executive power.” (footnotes and citation omitted)); Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, “If Angels 
Were to Govern”: The Need for Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 Duke L.J. 449, 
454 (1991) (“[T]he Court's role in separation of powers cases should be limited to determining whether the 
challenged branch action falls within the definition of that branch's constitutionally derived powers—
executive, legislative, or judicial.”).  
3 See, e.g., Jon D. Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians and Regulatory Rivals: An Account of the Old 
and New Separation of Powers, 91 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 227, 227 (2016) (underscoring “the multidimensional 
nature of administrative control in which the constitutional branches and the administrative rivals all 
compete with one another to influence administrative governance”); Laura S. Fitzgerald, Cadenced Power: 
The Kinetic Constitution, 46 Duke L.J. 679, 779 (1997) (characterizing the separation of powers principle 
“less [as] a device for policing institutional boundaries and more like a standard for preserving in that 
debate the qualities of participation and accountability . . . . [It] marks the cadence for the People's 
argument among themselves over time.”). 
4 See, e.g., Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic 18 
(2012) [hereinafter Posner & Vermeule, Executive Unbound] (arguing separation of powers has 
“collapsed” because of Madison’s incorrect assumption that “individual ambitions of government officials 
would cause them to support the power of the institutions they occupy”). 
5 For a comprehensive account of the relevant jurisprudence that emphasizes the Court’s movement 
between different theories of the separation of powers, see Aziz Z. Huq & Jon D. Michaels, The Cycles of 
Separation-of-Powers Jurisprudence, 126 Yale L.J. 346 (2016). 
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example, still oscillates between a categorical approach that emphasizes separation and a 
more fluid approach that celebrates balance and checking effects.6   
 
Competing theories of the separation of powers are explicit in the scholarship and 
implicit in the jurisprudence. Like theories in other constitutional domains,7 they purport 
to offer guidance across multiple doctrinal strands. At the same time, they can also seem 
continuous with a larger domain of ‘constitutional theory.’ As David Strauss has noted, 
constitutional theory writ large is typically framed as “an effort to justify a set of 
prescriptions about how certain controversial constitutional issues should be decided.”8 
Strauss further observes that a constitutional theory will “dra[w] on the bases of 
agreement that exist within the legal culture and trying to extend those agreed-upon 
principles to decide the cases or issues on which people disagree.”9  
 
But disagreement in the separation-of-powers context does not quite fit Strauss’s 
description. Theoretical disagreement in this domain remains lively—or perhaps hellishly 
Sisyphean—precisely because there is pervasive and deep disagreement about the 
“bases” and “principles” upon which any theoretical account with prescriptive force must 
necessarily rest. As a result, the immediate debate about specific separation-of-powers 
issues can be scraped away, like so many coats of thick-lathered varnish, to uncover a 
deeper layer of disagreement concerning the empirical and normative premises that 
support different theories. This more profound layer of disagreements is usefully labeled 
‘metatheoretical’ by analogy to the philosophical field of metaethics. The latter “is the 
attempt to understand the metaphysical, epistemological, semantic, and psychological, 
presuppositions and commitments of moral thought, talk, and practice.” 10  
Correspondingly, a metatheoretical disagreement in the law turns on the meaning, 
                                                
6 Compare Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2609 (2011) (holding that assignment “counterclaims by the 
estate against persons filing claims against the estate” in an Article I bankruptcy proceeding violated to 
Article III), with Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1954-55 (2015) (allowing litigant 
consent to cure an Article III defect in Article I bankruptcy adjudication); see also Executive Benefits 
Insurance Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165, 2172-73 (2014) (holding that an Article III flaw is cured if 
the bankruptcy judge’s ruling is treated as proposed findings of facts and legal conclusions, to be evaluated 
de novo by a district court). For a comprehensive analysis of the Article III question in bankruptcy, see 
Anthony J. Casey & Aziz Z. Huq, The Article III Problem in Bankruptcy, 82 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1155 (2015). 
7 For an excellent, and self-conscious example, see Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The 
Fourth Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 77 Geo. L.J. 19, 21 & n.6 (1988) (cataloging “attempts to 
formulate a general theory of the fourth amendment in light of modern constitutional thought” before their 
own). 
8 David A. Strauss, What Is Constitutional Theory?, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 581, 582 (1999). One might reasonably 
object that Strauss is far too optimistic about the extent and nature of disagreement in constitutional theory 
writ large, but that is orthogonal to my point here. There are other definitions of “constitutional theory,” 
many of which focus on the general question of how the Constitution as a whole should be glossed and 
applied by courts. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose A Constitutional Theory, 87 Cal. L. 
Rev. 535, 537 (1999) (describing constitutional theories as concerning “the nature of the United States 
Constitution and how judges should interpret and apply it”); Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional 
Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 1 (1998) (“Constitutional theory, as I shall use the term, is the effort to 
develop a generally accepted theory to guide the interpretation of the Constitution of the United States.”). 
9 Strauss, supra note 8, at 592.  
10 Geoff Sayre-McCord, Metaethics, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Edward N. Zalta ed., 
2014), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/metaethics/. 
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analytic robustness, normative salience, or empirical validity of a term that appears in one 
or more theories of the separation of powers. Theory predicts or directs outcomes in 
specific cases. Metatheory, in contrast, does not directly specify the normative framework 
tendered for the analysis and resolution of specific legal disputes. It is instead concerned 
with the detailing of necessary and foundational terms used within, and shared across, 
one or more theories.11   
 
A central claim advanced in this review is that separation-of-powers metatheory is 
characterized by a number of predictable and persistent questions, and that these either do 
not arise in other domains of constitutional theory, or, if they do have more general 
analogs, arise in distinct forms in the horizontal governmental structure context. In the 
analysis of relations between Congress and the executive branch—the focus of the book 
under review here—three such questions reoccur and deserve close attention.12 First, 
there is dispute about how the motives of relevant institutional actors should be modeled 
(if at all) for the purpose of defining horizontal relationships between the branches. 
Second, there is a question of what sources of law—text, pre-ratification history, post-
ratification practice, judicial precedent, or first-order normative reasoning—exist, and 
also how they should be weighed and prioritized. Finally, a metatheory of the separation 
of powers will also need to articulate an idea about how institutions either remain at 
equilibrium over time, or how they change within constitutional contours. Attention to 
metatheory surfaces these distinct problems, which cut across diverse theories, as isolate 
objects of scholarly inquiry.  
 
While each of these metatheoretical debates touches on wider hermeneutical 
debates in constitutional law, each also has a distinctive character in the separation-of-
powers domain. Their unique profiles are worth briefly sketching. Consider first the 
question of official motive. The separation of powers concerns the threshold articulation 
of basic institutional building blocks of the state. Defining institutional boundaries often 
means making assumptions about the relative strength of legalistic, partisan, and 
institutional motives on the part of official actors. These questions do not arise in the 
same way in the definition and application of constitutional rights.13 The definition of 
                                                
11 A handful of scholars have employed the term “metatheory” in the constitutional context, albeit in a 
different sense from me. Michael Dorf describes questions about how to evaluate constitutional theories as 
metatheoretical. Michael C. Dorf, Create Your Own Constitutional Theory, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 593, 597 
(1999). Garrick Pursley, in addition, uses the term to refer rather vaguely to “the question of theory 
assessment in legal theory.” Garrick B. Pursley, Metatheory, 47 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 1333, 1337 (2016); see 
also Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 Yale L.J. 1, 16 
(1984) (suggesting that metatheories are needed to “tell us where to draw the line” within legal theories). I 
use the term in a simpler fashion to capture debate about terms or ideas shared across different 
jurisprudential theories; unlike Dorf, I do not use it to refer to procedures or criteria for choosing between 
such theories.   
12 See infra Part I (setting forth these lines of debate in more detail).  
13 Note the “somewhat.” I am cognizant that Akhil Amar, among others, has insisted on the structural 
quality of the Bill of Rights. But his account of the Bill of Rights does not accent the branches per se, but 
rather a host of distinct, extrinsic actors: “states’ rights and majority rights alongside individual and 
minority rights; and protection of various intermediate associations—church, militia, and jury—designed to 
create an educated and virtuous electorate.” Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights As A Constitution, 100 
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constitutional rights generally doesn’t depend on how official motives are defined. 
Rather, it is more common to account for the motives of regulated official actors in an 
acoustically separate remedy stage. Moreover, to the extent that courts engage “remedial 
equilibration,” whereby the costs and benefits of various remedies shape the contours of 
individual rights, it is with a measure of embarrassment and obfuscation.14   
 
Similarly, debates on the sources of law for separation-of-powers disputes plainly 
overlap with more general debates on the appropriate hermeneutical approach to the 
Constitution more generally.15 But the identification of the sources of law in separation-
of-powers cases also implicates distinctive problems not observed elsewhere. The 
hermeneutic heft of historical “gloss” comprising the past acts of officials wielding state 
power,16 for instance, is of a different magnitude in the separation-of-powers context 
from the weighing of prior state practice in, say, debates about whether Brown v. Board 
of Education17 was rightly decided. 
 
Finally, questions of equilibrium versus change have a distinct complexion in the 
separation-of-powers context. In rights cases, there is often a question of how a general 
value such as privacy or free exercise will be applied to new, unanticipated context. The 
challenge of time to the separation of powers is different. Even in the first decades of the 
Republic, territorial expansion augmented the number of states and subtly shifted the 
dynamics of federalism.18 It also presented the national government with new legal 
difficulties, new geostrategic opportunities, and new internal governance challenges.19 
How the national government was expected to grow, and yet at the same time remain 
                                                                                                                                            
Yale L.J. 1131, 1132 (1991). If Amar is correct (and I think he is to some extent), it may be that some of 
the metatheoretical questions raised here deserve airing more broadly in constitutional theory. 
14 Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 857, 873 (1999) 
(defining “remedial equilibration” as a process in which “constitutional rights are inevitably shaped by, and 
incorporate, remedial concerns”). For reasons Richard Fallon has forcefully outlined, this view is “unduly 
reductionist” and inconsistent with “widely shared assumptions of the legal profession.” Richard H. Fallon, 
Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1274, 1314 (2006). 
15 For a synoptic and fair-minded view of the relevant approaches, see Sotirious A. Barber & James 
Fleming, Constitutional Interpretation: The Basic Questions 59-66 (2007).  
16 For a definition of historical gloss, see Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the 
Separation of Powers, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 411, 418-19 (2012) [hereinafter Bradley & Morrison, Historical 
Gloss] (discussing the use of “historical gloss” in the separation of powers context).   
17 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
18 Justifying Lewis and Clark’s literal path-marking expedition west, Thomas Jefferson told Congress on 
January 18, 1803, that “[t]he interests of commerce place the principal object [of the expedition] within the 
constitutional powers and care of Congress . . . that it should incidentally advance the geographical 
knowledge of our own continent cannot but be an additional gratification.” Thomas Jefferson, Message to 
Congress (Jan. 18, 1803), http:// www.loc.gov/exhibits/lewisandclark/transcript56.html. 
19 For example, the Louisiana Purchase itself presented an early, and quite serious, constitutional question 
of the separation of powers—one that, in a striking harbinger, was never adjudicated by a federal court. 
Sanford Levinson & Bartholomew H. Sparrow, Introduction, in The Louisiana Purchase and American 
Expansion 1803-1898 1, 3 (Sanford Levinson & Bartholomew H. Sparrow eds., 2005). On the internal 
political challenges created by conflicts over slavery’s expansion, see Aziz Z. Huq, The Function of Article 
V, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1165, 1185 (2014); Barry R. Weingast, Designing Constitutional Stability in 
Democratic Constitutional Design and Public Policy: Analysis and Evidence 343, 357-58 (Roger D. 
Congleton & Birgitta Swedenborg eds., 2006). 
 7 
faithful to the original architecture, was thus a problem from the Republic’s inception.20 
It was (and is) a problem of whether equilibrium should be preferred to change, in a way 
that is distinct from questions of time in other constitutional domains. Across the board, 
therefore, there is good cause to expect that separation of powers metatheory will be 
characterized by problems partly contiguous with, but also distinct from, the foundational 
problems of constitutional theory writ large.  
 
The immediate platform for examining these problems is the publicity of Josh 
Chafetz’s insightful monograph Congress’s Constitution: Legislative Authority and the 
Separation of Powers [hereinafter Congress’s Constitution]. Historically inclined, 
steeped in doctrine, and intimate with much of the relevant political science literature, 
Chafetz is a sophisticated guide to separation-of-powers dynamics. His book focuses on 
Congress-executive relations, which is the locus of current scholarly preoccupation.21 Yet 
Congress’s Constitution warrants notice because it inverts the modal orientation of 
scholarly attention in this field. Chafetz’s main topos is our federal legislature. With a 
handful of exceptions,22 scholars are preternaturally beguiled by the mysteries of the 
executive branch.23 This asymmetry tracks a more general drift of effectual governance 
authority from Article I to Article II actors across the twentieth century.24 Chafetz rows 
against the current by taking Congress seriously as a constitutional actor.  
 
Yet this is perhaps not the most noteworthy element of the book. For Congress’s 
Constitution also candidly engages not just with theory and application, but also with 
metatheory. Indeed, the first two chapters of Congress’s Constitution present a general 
account of separation of powers metatheory that warrants close and careful scrutiny—
both for the commendable ambition to explicate its metatheory systematically and also 
for its specific content. The rewards of a close reading of Congress’s Constitution, I will 
                                                
20 For a recent revisionist account of the legal historiography, see Alison L. LaCroix, The Interbellum 
Constitution: Federalism in the Long Founding Moment, 67 Stan. L. Rev. 397, 401 (2015) (identifying 
early nineteenth century concerns in terms of “state consent; distinctions among Congress's powers to 
appropriate funds for internal improvements, to execute the improvements itself, and to transfer the public 
lands to the states for the purposes of executing the improvements; and the role of the federal government 
as proprietor of the public lands”). 
21 For an earlier generation of scholars who came of age in an era of relative détente between the president 
and Congress, the question of legislative ability to eliminate federal-court jurisdiction loomed larger. See 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr. et al., Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 295-460 (7th 
ed. 2015) (summarizing (!) various permutations of the debate). A decade ago Congress’s effort to 
eliminate federal-court jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions filed by alleged enemy combatants 
intermittently rekindled the debate. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, 96 Va. L. 
Rev. 1043, 1046–47 (2010) [hereinafter Fallon, Jurisdiction-Stripping].  
22 See, e.g., the essays in The Least Examined Branch: The Role of Legislatures in the Constitutional State 
(Richard Bauman & Tzvi Kahana, eds., 2006); Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional Design 
of a Thayerian Congress, 50 Duke L.J. 1277 (2001). 
23 Representative examples (without endeavoring to be exhaustive) include Posner & Vermeule, Executive 
Unbound, supra note 4, at passim; Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Presidential Power, Historical 
Practice, and Legal Constraint, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 1097 (2013) [hereinafter Bradley & Morrison, 
Presidential Power]; Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245 (2001). 
24 I suspect it also has something to do with the fact that more legal scholars have experience in the 
executive branch rather than Congress. A less charitably reading might be that more legal scholars expect 
employment in the executive branch—or a nomination nod by someone in the executive branch.  
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argue, flow more from the successes and shortfalls of this deeply embedded element of 
Chafetz’s project, and less from the extensive historical and doctrinal exegeses that the 
book also contains.    
 
I should disavow up front any effort to use Chafetz’s account as a stalking horse 
for my own theoretical claims.  My aim here, indeed, is emphatically not to tender my 
own theory, or metatheory, of the separation of powers. More modestly, I hope that my 
reflection on Congress’s Constitution works as a useful starting point for fleshing out the 
nature and extent of deep disagreement over the predicates of separation of powers 
theory. By airing these disagreements in a more precise fashion than the literature to date 
has managed, it may be that scholars and jurists of the separation of powers will gain 
better purchase on how they disagree, even if the disputes over specific cases continue to 
linger.  
 
The review has three Parts. The first provides context by offering a simplified 
topography of current theoretical debates over the separation of powers into which 
Chafetz intervenes. It posits three axes of metatheoretical debate that striate the current 
literature. The second Part examines the theoretical and applied contribution of 
Congress’s Constitution. The final Part trains upon Chafetz’s metatheoretical premises: 
Congress’s Constitution is deployed as a case-study to demonstrate the utility of a focus 
upon separation-of-powers metatheory as well as theory. The exercise also generates a 
series of insights into the strengths, weaknesses, and lacunae in Chafetz’s work, as well 
as thoughts about the future of separation-of-powers theory.   
 
I. THEORY (AND METATHEORY) FOR THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 
 
It is a truth grudgingly acknowledged by all 1L Con Law students that judges and 
scholars disagree profoundly about what the phrase “separation of powers” means. A 
simplified cartography of those disagreements is useful here two reasons. First, by 
mapping the landscape of theoretical disagreement, it is possible to better understand its 
true springs. These concern the meaning of terms, the importance of certain empirical 
regularities, and the wellsprings of legal normativity—i.e., the pivotal questions of 
separation-of-powers metatheory. Second, with accounts of both theory and metatheory 
in hand, it is possible to position Congress’s Constitution in the scholarly landscape, and 
thereby to ascertain the precise nature of its contribution by considering how it tracks, or 
deviates from, earlier accounts of the separation of powers. This Part thus begins by 
mapping the terrain of separation-of-powers theory, and then extracting three general, 
underlying metatheoretical springs. Readers interested in the claims advanced in 
Congress’s Constitution and my analysis thereof will not find anything of interest here. 
The book’s central claims—and its strengths and weaknesses—are the subject of Parts II 
and III, and are not addressed even in passing here.  
 
 9 
A. Theories of the Separation of Powers   
  
Scholars typically adopt one of three accounts of interaction between the three 
branches of the federal government.25 These models, at least in ideal type, can be called 
the separation, balance, and exogenous models. Whereas these models also inflect the 
case law, I focus here on scholarly presentations of the relationship between the executive 
and Congress—which is the central axis of contention today, and which forms the nub of 
Congress’s Constitution.26  
 
1.  Separation models  
 
Separation models of the separation of powers understand each branch as a 
distinctive and stand-alone entity wielding a defined, delimited set of powers.27 They 
furnish a Newtonian model of branches as separate zones of authority interacting much as 
a set of billiard balls on the blaze interact. In its simplest and most elegant exposition, the 
model holds that “Congress’ grants of legislative powers must enable it to legislate, the 
President's grant of the executive power must enable him to execute all federal laws, and 
the federal judiciary's grant of the judicial power must enable the federal courts to decide 
certain cases and controversies.”28 Such models are often derived from textual exegesis 
of the original meaning or understand of the first three Articles of the Constitution and 
historical practice.29 But they need not be so rooted.30  
 
Leading work in this field takes what political scientists once derisively termed a 
“literary” approach.31 One of its leading exponents, Saikrishna Prakash, hence begins 
with the eighteenth-century dictionary definitions of the powers vested by the first 
                                                
25 This summary focuses on U.S. constitutional scholars, and excludes constitutional scholarship. For a 
pathbreaking comparative piece that identifies “the model of constrained parliamentarianism as the most 
promising framework for future development of the separation of powers. Bruce Ackerman, The New 
Separation of Powers, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 633, 640 (2000). 
26 The first two of these models are sometimes labeled “formalist” and “functionalist.” See Peter L. Strauss, 
Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions—A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 
Cornell L. Rev. 488 (1987). I avoid these labels because I want to juxtapose both with a third, even more 
functionalist, model. Further, as others have observed, the labels of formalism and functionalism are 
somewhat misleading insofar as so-called formalists often have a functional account of their separation 
principle. Victoria F. Nourse, Toward a New Constitutional Anatomy, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 835, 899 (2004). 
27 Readers should be aware that the first paragraph of each of the following sections comprises my own 
synthesis and summary of the three different positions. These opening paragraphs are light on citations 
because they are synthetic and generalizing. The following paragraphs then set out particular positions in 
more detail.      
28 Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 
541, 544 (1994). 
29 See, e.g., id. at 546 (starting with “the original meaning of the words of the constitutional text that the 
Framers actually wrote”); Steven G. Calabresi, The Vesting Clauses as Power Grants, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 
1377, 1381 (1994) (similar analysis of the term “vest”). 
30 Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 4 
(1994) (defending a robust account of presidential authority based on “the best reading of the framers' 
structure translated into the current, and radically transformed, context,” and explicitly considering and 
rejecting original meaning as a source). 
31 Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents 37 (1990). 
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Articles of the Constitution as the basis for specifying powers granted to each branch.32 
The executive, he explains, possesses “all of those rights, powers, and privileges 
commonly associated with a chief executive vested with the executive power, subject to 
the many exceptions and limitations enumerated in Article II and elsewhere in the 
Constitution.”33 Prakash extends the same approach to Congress. In an article on military 
powers, he thus categorizes the legislature’s war and emergency powers as “sweeping” 
through a close examination of the “basic structure” of the Constitution, the parallel 
between that structure and precursor models among the early American states, and the 
extensive textual specifications in Article I of “powers to declare war, raise an army and 
navy, and regulate … [all of which] implied that Congress could continue to pass laws 
needed to defeat foreign enemies.”34 Writing about the courts, Caleb Nelson strikes a 
kindred separationist chord when he proposes that “Article III … strongly implies that 
neither Congress nor entities within the executive branch can exercise ‘[t]he judicial 
Power of the United States,’” but vests it “in true federal courts.”35  At the logical limit of 
this approach is Dean John Manning’s textualist reductio, which saps substance from the 
conception of the separation of powers beyond the specific entailments of granulated 
morsels of constitutional text.36 
Another prominent strand of separationist reasoning, associated often with Steven 
Calabresi, focuses on the extent of hierarchical control over personnel decisions within 
the executive branch. Advancing a separation model of inter-branch relations, the so-
                                                
32 Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, 2003 U. Ill. L. Rev. 701, 714 (2003) 
[hereinafter Prakash, Essential Meaning]  (quoting 1 Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English 
Language 684 (4th ed. 1773)); see also Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Imperial from the Beginning: The 
Constitution of the Original Executive 1-11 (2015) [hereinafter Prakash, The Constitution of the Original 
Executive] (exploring the availability of a linguistically rooted approach to the exegesis of various 
government powers).  
33 Prakash, Essential Meaning, supra note 32, at 713. For a similar analysis of foreign affairs, see Saikrishna 
B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 Yale L.J. 231, 253 
(2001) (“Executive power, as commonly understood in the eighteenth century, included foreign affairs 
powers.”). But cf. John Hart Ely, On Constitutional Ground 149 (1996) (“The Constitution gives the 
president no general right to make foreign policy. Quite the contrary[:] virtually every substantive 
constitutional power touching on foreign affairs is vested in Congress.”). 
34 Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Sweeping Domestic War Powers of Congress, 113 Mich. L. Rev. 
1337, 1367 (2015) [hereinafter Prakash, Sweeping Domestic War Powers]; cf. Prakash & Ramsey, supra 
note 33, at 241 (“Congress enjoys only certain specific foreign affairs powers outlined in Article I, Section 
8.”). 
35 Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 559, 565 (2007); id. at 571-72 
(defining the “judicial Power” in terms of “the kinds of legal interests that were at stake,” and 
distinguishing public and private rights).   
36 John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 1939, 1948-49 
(2011) (arguing for “a clause-centered approach” that rejects any “freestanding separation of powers 
doctrine”); accord John F. Manning, Foreword: The Means of Constitutional Power, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 
55 (2014) (“[T]o the extent one can discern the purposes underlying federalism and separation of powers, 
those purposes are vague, numerous, unranked, and often self-contradictory. Because neither doctrine 
provides firm answers in the abstract, the particulars of each almost invariably require the creation, rather 
than the excavation, of constitutional meaning.”). Manning styles his intervention as diverging from the 
approaches of both functionalists and formalists. Although he and the scholars he denominates as formalists 
may differ as to the level of generality, both he and the formalists work from a textual unit of a clause of an 
Article, rather than reasoning down from a systemic property such as balance. Hence, he is appropriately 
labeled denominated a separation theorist for my purposes. 
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called “Unitary executive theorists claim that all federal officers exercising executive 
power must be subject to the direct control of the President”; they resist the 
countervailing argument that Congress can limit such direct control.37 Their argument is 
supported by textual evidence that congressional impingement on executive control of 
administration is impermissible,38 and also through a voluminous marshaling of historical 
evidence and a suite of functional arguments.39 
The analytic key to this approach is its identification of a specific branch’s 
powers, commonly based on text, pre-ratification interpretive conventions,40 and post-
ratification practice. Given the linguistic separation and variegation of Articles I, II, and 
III—each of which starts with a Vesting Clause referencing a distinct and different 
power—this approach will naturally tend to end in an account of the branches as separate 
and distinct entities.41 Overlap between branches, to be sure, is conceptually possible.42 
But it does not often play a motivating role in the theory.43 
A separation model is in tension with observed practice in contemporary 
government in many ways. Congress exercises influence over the content of regulation 
and operation of administrative agencies through its oversight process. The agencies 
themselves blend together the specification of first-order conduct rules, the investigation 
of past violations, and (at times) adjudication of such acts. Faced with what must seem 
like wholesale defenestration of constitutional norms, advocates of the separation model 
frankly recognize the “huge” magnitude of the perceived problem and the sweeping 
nature of their preferred reforms.44 Its advocates look to the courts as the opening artillery 
                                                
37 Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 2, at 1158; see also Steven G. Calabresi & Nicholas Terrell, The Fatally 
Flawed Theory of the Unbundled Executive, 93 Minn. L. Rev. 1696, 1697 (2009) (defining unitary 
executive theory in terms of the “presidential power to remove all subordinates in the executive branch for 
policy reasons”). 
38 Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive: Presidential Power from Washington 
to Bush 30-38 (2008) (summarizing textual arguments).   
39 Id. at 39-416 (recounting history at length and in detail). For functional arguments, see, e.g., Steven G. 
Calabresi, The Virtues of Presidential Government: Why Professor Ackerman Is Wrong to Prefer the 
German to the U.S. Constitution, 18 Const. Comment. 51, 52-53 (2001) (“The existence of presidentialism 
and of the separation of powers in our Constitution is a praiseworthy feature of the document that should be 
emulated abroad.”). 
40 See Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 519, 549 (2003) 
[hereinafter Nelson, Originalism] (offering an account of the hermeneutical role of “the linguistic and legal 
principles that formed the background for the Constitution”). 
41 “Checks and balances do not arise from separation theory, but are at odds with it. Checks and balances 
have to do with corrective invasion of the separated powers.” Gary Wills, Explaining America: The 
Federalist 119 (1981). 
42 Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Separation and Overlap of War and Military Powers, 87 Tex. L. Rev. 
299, 308 (2008) (recognizing “the possibility of separation and overlap” but arguing that the latter should 
be analyzed “on a narrower basis—that is to say, clause by clause”). 
43 It is thus telling that Prakash begins his analysis of war powers by specifying “exclusive” executive and 
congressional powers, and only then considering the Constitution’s “system of concurrent powers.” Id. at 
351; see also Saikrishna Prakash, Removal and Tenure in Office, 92 Va. L. Rev. 1779, 1785 (2006) 
(contending that “the Constitution establishes a system of shared removal powers”).    
44 Steven G. Calabresi, Mark E. Berghausen, and Skylar Albertson, The Rise and Fall of the Separation of 
Powers, 106 Nw. U. L. Rev. 527, 545 (2012) (proposing dramatic reforms to the operation of all three 
branches). 
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barrage in a long war to restore appropriate separation through vigorous superintendence 
of institutional walls.45 Indeed, it is possible to gloss the literature on the separation 
model as a sub rosa brief to the federal judiciary soliciting urgent and extensive 
intervention to change the shape of the federal government and vindicate a foregone 
fidelity.  
2.  Balance models  
Balance models of the separation of powers reject the idea that it is possible to 
derive from either the constitution’s text or history a delimited and determinate set of 
powers for assignment to each branch seriatim. To the contrary, the leading work in this 
vein finds the text inescapably ambivalent.46 It instead situates the Constitution in what is 
described as a fluid, contested, and unstable eighteenth-century debate about the 
appropriate internal organization of government.47 Rather than finding uniform evidence 
of a unitary executive that is acoustically separated from quotidian congressional control, 
for example, advocates of the balance model find more variation and ambiguity in late 
eighteenth-century state constitutional treatment of the same issue.48 As a result, they 
decline to draw a strong conclusion from the Constitution’s text, pre-ratification practice, 
or Founding-era interpretative conventions about the precise contours of each branch’s 
authority.  
 Rather than starting with semantics, balance model proponents focus on the 
purposes of the Constitution’s design. It can be usefully characterized as architectural 
rather than literary. Its focus is upon the net effect of interactions between the branches, 
rather than on matching specific powers to particular state entities. Hence, on Martin 
Flaherty’s influential historical account, the Constitution’s tripartite design of branches 
was intended to ensure that “both the basic division of powers, as well as their frequent 
mixture, merely served the more fundamental goals of ensuring that the branches of 
                                                
45 See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, The Constitution as Political Structure 99-134, 101 (1995) (“[T]he Court's 
role in separation-of-powers cases is to be limited to determining whether the challenged branch action falls 
within the definition of that branch's constitutionally derived powers. . . .”). 
46 Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 
Colum. L. Rev. 573, 603 (1984) (finding “imprecision inherent in the definition and separation of the three 
governmental powers”); see also Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism 
and Foreign Affairs, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 545, 553 (2004) (“[T]he textual arguments in support of the 
Vesting Clause Thesis are, at best, indeterminate.”); accord Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 30, at 47-48 
n.195 (“The [Article II] Vesting Clause does nothing more than show who . . . is to exercise the executive 
power, and not what that power is.”). Separation theorists, however, acknowledge this difficulty. Gary 
Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1231, 1238 n.45 (1994) 
[hereinafter Lawson, Rise and Rise] (“The problem of distinguishing the three functions of government has 
long been, and continues to be, one of the most intractable puzzles in constitutional law.”).  
47 Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 Yale L.J. 1725, 1755 (1996) (“[T]he complex, 
messy, and at times contradictory ferment in constitutional thinking renders it unlikely at best that, by 1787, 
Americans had reached a consensus on the doctrine in anything like the precise, thoroughgoing manner that 
modern formalists prescribe.”). 
48 See, e.g., Peter M. Shane, The Originalist Myth of the Unitary Executive, 19 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 323, 363 
(2016) (drawing on state constitutional text contemporaneous with the Constitution’s ratification to suggest 
that “despite executive power vesting clauses, each of the sixteen constitutions . . . contemplates either a 
mandatory or permissive legislative role in the appointment of officials involved in public administration”). 
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government would remain balanced, extending accountability throughout government, 
and making government more efficient than it had been in recent memory.49 For him, 
“the goal of balance” was “the Founding's most important separation of powers value.”50 
In a similar vein, Abner Greene argues the “checks and balances, rather than a system in 
which each branch exercises power on its own, ensures against the inflation of power in 
any one branch.”51 More recently, in a rich body of work (that includes an important 
article in these pages), Jon Michaels reads the Constitution to embody “an enduring, 
evolving commitment to separating and checking power.”52 Building on a literature about 
a so-called “internal separation of powers,”53 Michaels looks not to inter-branch relations, 
but rather to “subconstitutional, rivalrous counterweights [as a means] constrain the 
political leadership atop administrative agencies in ways more reliable and immediate 
than anything the legislature or courts could regularly do.”54 
Balance models of this ilk focus on system-level qualities, such as the relative 
legal or political powers of one branch as against another. They insist not on crisply 
demarcated fences, but either excavate commodious common spaces55 or explore the 
complexities of observed interbranch interactions.56 They appeal not to the legalistic 
touchstone of the separation model—which is the alignment between textual allocation 
and institutional practice—but to the practical consequences of institutional design as a 
whole. Balance, most importantly, is thought to generate systemic legitimacy and to 
promote individual liberty interests.57 
                                                
49 Flaherty, supra note 47, at 1784 (emphasis added).  
50 Id. at 1817; See also Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the 
Administrative State, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 452, 496 (1989) (describing the functionalist premise that 
“through the carefully orchestrated disposition and sharing of authority, restraint would be found in power 
counterbalancing power”). 
51 Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 123, 196 
(1994). 
52 Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 515, 520 (2015) 
[hereinafter Michaels, Enduring, Evolving]. 
53 For accounts of “internal” checks and balances, see Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as 
Constitutional Law, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 479, 498 (2010) (arguing that they are ways of enhancing legality 
and rights); accord Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today's Most Dangerous 
Branch from Within, 115 Yale L.J. 2314 (2006). 
54 Michaels, Enduring, Evolving, supra note 52, at 534; see also Huq & Michaels, supra note 5, at 391 
(positing a “thick political surround” as “a complex ecosystem of intrabranch and entirely external actors 
not traditionally accounted for in the separation-of-powers literature that do a lot of the work pushing and 
pulling, advancing prized values, and jockeying with one another”); Jon D. Michaels, Of Constitutional 
Custodians and Regulatory Rivals: An Account of the Old and New Separation of Powers, 91 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 227, 229 (2016) (describing, and finding normative significance in, “horizontal power dynamics 
between and among . . . administrative rivals” as a means of legitimating the administrative state). 
55 Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1513, 1527-28 (1991) 
(describing an approach to the separation of powers that stresses “the interdependence of the branches”). 
56 See, e.g., David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 Yale L.J. 2, 4 (2014) (focusing 
on the “informal norms that determine how [institutional] authorities are wielded and disputes about them 
settled”). Pozen’s close study of information leaks also probes what in effect is another element of these 
informal norms. David E. Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones 
Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 512, 624 (2013). 
57 See, e.g., David H. Moore, Taking Cues from Congress: Judicial Review, Congressional Authorization, 
and the Expansion of Presidential Power, 90 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1019, 1028 (2015) (positing that the 
 14 
Like separation models, balance models need not make a descriptive as opposed 
to a prescriptive claim. While they tend to lack the end-of-days tone of some separationist 
accounts, balance theorists disagree as to whether observed institutional dynamics reflect 
a constitutionally desirable equilibrium. Flaherty, for instance, views the executive 
branch as excessive powerful, and urges for a recalibration of interbranch relations to cut 
it down to size.58 Greene bemoans the welter of regulatory delegations, which in his view 
has left the balance of institutional powers quite lopsided.59 In contrast, Michaels is 
optimistic about the current administrative state, which he sees as an institutional locus in 
which the checking and balancing dynamics that previously occurred exclusively among 
the branches now takes place could be “renew[ed]” and “update[ed].”60 To Michaels, the 
impinging tide of privatization poses a fresh challenge to the post-New Deal 
reconstruction of the separation of powers—but one for which history provides adequate 
responsive tools.61 Despite these tonal differences, it bears noting, the kind of reforms 
that emerge from the balance model tend to be quite different from the recommendations 
that typically issue from the separation model. Whereas the separation model slides into a 
backward-looking Burkean cri de coeur about the follies of heedless institutional change, 
the balance model presses its spurs more deeply into the Constitution’s flanks. It presses 
for an even more headlong pursuit of institutional adaption and change in a rapidly 
evolving world.  
One element of this transformative commission is a relative skepticism about the 
wisdom of judicial review of separation-of-powers questions. The idea of balance 
provides no reliable benchmark for judicial application, since judges are unlikely to be 
well-positioned to evaluate the effects of institutional change on the interbranch status 
quo.62 If balance is elusive, especially from the vantage point of the bench, then why 
make it judicial enforceable? Justiciability, after all, only raises the expected costs of any 
institutional recalibration. The absence of judicial review, by contrast, lowers the 
transaction costs of institutional change. With the balance model’s eye on the future, and 
its default model acceleration, judicial review of questions of the separation of powers 
hence comes to be seen as an otiose encumbrance of a bygone era. So it is no surprise 
that scholars such as Flaherty have dim views of the justiciability of separation-of-powers 
                                                                                                                                            
“checks and balances” should be honored so as “better to preserve individual liberty”); Greene, supra note 
51, at 176 (“[T]he framers’ core checks and balances value was to ensure a balance of power among the 
branches—to prevent the tyranny of any one branch (and thus help preserve individual liberty) . . . .”); Cass 
R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 421, 443 (1987) (describing “the 
system of checks and balances as a necessary safeguard of private property and liberty against factionalism 
and self-interested representation”). 
58 Flaherty, supra note 47, at 1816-17 (discussing the “inexorable” increase in executive power).  
59 Greene, supra note 51, at 184 (complaining that “the nondelegation doctrine has been underenforced for 
the past fifty years”).  
60 Michaels, Enduring, Evolving, supra note 52, at 522. 
61 Id. at 522-23.  
62 For an extended unpacking of arguments for this position, see Aziz Z. Huq, The Negotiated Structural 
Constitution, 114 Colum. L. Rev. 1595, 1674-83 (2014) [hereinafter Huq, Negotiated Structural 
Constitution]. For a similar critique by an avowed formalist, see Stephen Carter, Constitutional 
Improprieties: Reflections on Mistretta, Morrison, and Administrative Government, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 357, 
375-76 (1990). 
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questions.63 This dim view of judicial intervention, while not a consistent tenet of the 
balance model, is likely the most natural inference from its logic—and yields another 
sharp contrast to the separation model.   
To this point, I have presented the balance and the separation models as crisply 
distinct. But these are only useful categories insofar as they help roughly slice up the 
jurisprudential territory. It is also possible to start from an assumption of separation, and 
to work in small steps toward an account of balanced, necessarily multivariate 
government action. Such accounts embarrass my crude attempt at categorization. But I 
think they are better thought of as filial derivatives of the balance model. These 
approaches link this idea of shared authorities to characterize government action that 
impinges on individual freedoms as necessarily requiring the involvement of diverse 
branches. They hence imagine legitimate government action as a composite in which 
each discrete branch’s distinctive function works in graceful counterpoise to create a 
harmonious whole. Their emphasis on the necessity of a totality, and upon the finely 
calibrated tensile equilibrium between branches, aligns them with the balance rather than 
with the separation model.  
Two prominent examples are associated with NYU Law School. Rachel Barkow 
has characterized the criminal justice system as demanding the input of all three branches 
prior to the deprivation of a person’s liberty.64 Her account hits a formalist note, but the 
service in a holistic chord. Jeremy Waldron has similarly suggested that the essence of 
the separation of powers lies in its demand for the “ordinary sequence” of legislative, 
executive, and judicial actions.65 Although Waldron’s account draws on logic familiar 
from the separation model insofar as it insists upon distinguishing the branches, it better 
aligns with the balance model insofar as he insists not on each power in isolation, but 
rather views them together as a “general articulated scheme of governance.” 66  In 
Waldron’s work in particular, formalism about institutional functions has as archaistic 
                                                
63 Flaherty, supra note 47, at 1828 (“The Supreme Court should rarely intervene in separation of powers 
conflicts. When it does, it should do so principally when faced with a compelling violation of one of the 
basic values of balance, joint accountability, or sufficient energy.”). Greene, in contrast, generally approves 
of the doctrine’s outcomes. Greene, supra note 51, at 196. Michaels and I have coauthored a piece that 
offers a sympathetic reconstruction of the Court’s jurisprudence in this field as an effort to adapt and 
respond to the complex institutional environment in which the branches operate. See Huq & Michaels, 
supra note 5, at 416-435. The article’s conclusion carefully hedges any normative implication from the 
doctrinal reconstruction because the authors’ views of the merits of the justiciability question diverged. Id. 
at 437.  
64 Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 989, 1012 (2006) 
(making an “argument for strict separation of powers when the state uses its criminal powers”). 
65 Jeremy Waldron, Separation of Powers in Thought and Practice?, 54 B.C. L. Rev. 433, 434–35 (2013) 
(“The idea is . . . an insistence that anything we do to X or about X must be preceded by an exercise of 
legislative power that lays down a general rule applying to everyone, not just X, and a judicial proceeding 
that makes a determination that X's conduct in particular falls within the ambit of that rule, and so on.”). 
66 Id. at 466. Rebecca Brown offers a somewhat similar claim that the separation of powers should be 
“understood as a concern for protecting individual rights against encroachment by a tyrannical majority.” 
Brown, supra note 55, at 1516.   
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affect. It works as a stilted but necessary artifice for redeeming necessary institutional 
reticulation, which in turn enables meaningfully civil democratic self-government.67  
3.  Exogenous models  
 
Exogenous models of the separation of powers renounce both the task of 
allocating powers to distinct branches and also the task of discerning ways to maintain a 
balance or equilibrium across the federal government. Abandoning criteria either explicit 
in or immanent within the Constitution’s design, such models find benchmarks for 
constitutional evaluation beyond the document.    
 
The exogenous model starts from the proposition that it is not possible to identify 
ex ante a specific government action as legislative, executive, or judicial because there is 
commonly an observational equivalence between those forms of state action. Scholars 
working in this vein are skeptical of any approach that treats the “relevant constitutional 
language . . . as a set of descriptive labels, a set of terms like “executive,” “state,” or 
“judicial” (terms that seem ripe for definition or drawing boundaries), [such that] texts 
are then matched against the challenged practice under review.”68 They are skeptical that 
the “branch” is the truly relevant unit of analysis if one wishes to understand and predict 
the actions of official actors.69  
In a leading critical statement, Dean Elizabeth Magill argued that even if 
functional distinctions can be identified there is still “[n]o reason” to expect that 
“functional dispersal of power creates and maintains tension and competition among the 
departments.”70 Her former colleague at the University of Virginia School of Law,71 
Daryl Levinson, has in similar terms challenged the implicit assumption that officials 
within a branch will pursue the latter’s interests faithfully.72    
                                                
67 This part of Waldron’s argument is better developed in Jeremy Waldron, Political Political Theory: 
Essays on Institutions 111 (2016).  
68Nourse, supra note 26, at 841; see also M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation 
of Powers Law, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 603, 604 (2001) [hereinafter Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches] 
(“The effort to identify and separate governmental powers fails because, in the contested cases, there is no 
principled way to distinguish between the relevant powers.”); accord David Orentlicher, Conflicts of 
Interest and the Constitution, 59 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 713, 726 (2002). 
69 Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches, supra note 68, at 606 (arguing that “government authority cannot 
be parceled neatly into three categories, and government actors cannot be understood solely as members of 
a branch of government”); accord Huq & Michaels, supra note 5, at 391-407.. 
70 M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1127, 1170 
(2000) [hereinafter Magill, Real Separation]. 
71 The identification of institutional affiliations is not merely a heuristic for organizing the taxonomy here.  
Rather, the institutional context in which scholarship is produced matters in the sense that physical 
proximity makes the diffusion of intentions easier, and the alignment of ideas easier. Hence, it should not 
surprise that leading law schools, such as NYU and Virginia, should evince some elements of discrete, 
hard-edged intellectual formations.      
72 Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 124 
Harv. L. Rev. 657, 670 (2011) [hereinafter Levinson, Parchment and Politics] (“Madison never explained 
why the branches of government, or the state and federal governments, would reliably have political 
incentives at odds with one another—why they would tend to compete rather than cooperate or collude.”). 
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The exogenous model also turns away from the aspiration of balance. Again, 
Magill’s work provides the building blocks for a skeptical turn. Not only is the idea of 
“power” in the analysis of interbranch relations ambiguous and underspecified,73 Magill 
observes, but rarely is any explanation offered for how a balance between the branches is 
to be achieved.74 Magill’s argument is not focused on judicial capacity to measure 
balance: It is rather a coruscating root-and-branch criticism of the concept. Hence, its 
implication is not simply that courts should decline to enforce constitutional common-law 
prohibitions founded on an assumption of balance. It is rather that the enterprise of 
identifying any kind of architectural equilibrium between the branches is a fools’ errand 
in the first instance.75  
An implication of these criticisms is that the separation of powers cannot be 
evaluated on the basis of intrinsic criteria—i.e., normative values implicit in the 
Constitution’s design. And if the literary and the architectural accounts of the separation 
of powers fail, the path is clear for a consideration of alternative explanations and 
arguments that look beyond the Constitution’s text to evaluate institutional arrangements.  
Exogenous models that emerge from the critical ground-clearing in Magill’s and 
others’ work can take either a positive or a normative flavor. One largely positive 
pathway dispenses almost wholly with the ‘law’ of the separation of powers, and looks 
alternatively to its politics. If there is no firm functional contour to a branch’s action, and 
if there is no interbranch equilibrium to be maintained, then what is left is the raw force 
of partisan politics. On this account, associated now with Daryl Levinson and Richard 
Pildes, the development of a national political-party system, although unforeseen by the 
Constitution’s framers, has “tied the power and political fortunes of government officials 
to issues and elections,” and thereby fostered “a set of incentives that rendered these 
officials largely indifferent to the powers and interests of the branches per se.” 76 As a 
result, “When government is unified and the engine of party competition is removed from 
the internal structure of government, we should expect interbranch competition to 
dissipate.”77 The result is a Beardian78 account of constitutional law in which “the 
interests of the politically powerful” dominate.79 The strength of these exogenous models 
                                                
73 Magill, Real Separation, supra note 70, at 1195-96 (developing ambiguities in the relevant conception of 
power). 
74 Id. at 1173 (criticizing the idea that the “dispersal of governmental functions mysteriously leads to 
balance, but the assumptions under which that balance occurs are obscure”). Magill is equally critical of the 
hybrid logic of the sort Barkow and Waldron develop, which blends separation and balance. Id. at 1174 
(“[A]ttempting to merge the distinct conceptions into a coherent set of ideas is a fruitless enterprise.”).  
75 Id. at 1194 (“We do not know what “balance” means, and we do not know how it is achieved or 
maintained.”); see also Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches, supra note 68, at 605 (“We have not come 
close to articulating a vision of what an ideal balance would look like.”). 
76 Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 2311, 2323 
(2006). 
77 Id. at 2329; accord Bradley & Morrison, Historical Gloss, supra note 16, at 443 (“[T] he Madisonian 
model of interbranch rivalry is especially inaccurate during times of unified government.”).  
78 Charles A. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States (rev. ed. 2012) 
(contending that the 1787 Constitution was designed to facilitate the retention of wealth by, and the transfer 
of wealth to, a small minority of propertied men). 
79 Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitutional Law, Public Law, 
122 Harv. L. Rev. 1791, 1833 (2009) (“Constitutional law is pervasively shaped by the same political 
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is largely descriptive rather than normative. For it is hard to see the allure in a normative 
constitutional theory that directs the strong to take what they can, and the weak to bear 
what they must.80  
The other available pathway if one believes concepts of separation and balance 
are flawed beyond redemption is to appeal directly to social welfare as a desirable 
maximand. The leading scholarship on this point, by Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, 
identifies the executive branch as the optimal instrument of public policy. Posner and 
Vermeule assert that “major constraints on the executive . . . do not arise from law or 
from the separation-of-powers framework,” because legislators and courts are necessarily 
“reactive and marginal” in comparison to the presidency.81 They contend that this is a 
normatively desirable state of affairs. On their view, the executive will by dint of 
institutional specialization and better access to information typically select the better 
policy.82 A “rational and well informed” executive acting without constraints will always 
outperform the same body constrained by other branches or noisome rights.83 Concerns 
about excessive concentrations of governmental authority in the executive’s hands are 
unwarranted because chief executives are necessarily subject to electoral checks.84 
Compliance with the “law and executive practice” are important not because of an 
intrinsic interest in legality but because they “allow a well-motivated executive to send a 
credible signal of his motivations, committing to use increased discretion in public-
spirited ways.”85 The result is a happy gloss on the modern dominance of the executive 
branch as a benign Leviathan, duly attentive to the interests of its citizenry thanks to 
elections and effortlessly selecting among available policies with Panglossian fortuity. 
                                                                                                                                            
forces that it purports to regulate.”). Note that Goldsmith and Levinson’s account does not specify a 
definition of “power” or “political forces.” They point to federal actors, state governments, and social 
movements as examples of the forces shaping constitutional law, id. at 1811-12, suggesting an 
understanding of politics that is capacious and not limited to partisan forces.   
80 Writing in a more normative vein, Levinson and Pildes offer a set of recommendations “for preventing 
strongly unified party government from taking hold.” Levinson & Pildes, supra note 76, at 2380. (For a 
similar turn toward a “minimally functional democracy” as a normative objective, see Daryl J. Levinson, 
Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 915, 972 (2005).) To the extent 
that their reform agenda accepts and builds upon the institutional dominance of the two main political 
parties, it is not at all clear that its fundamentally quiescent orientation toward elite dominated 
constitutional law and politics is meaningfully inflected.  
81 Posner & Vermeule, Executive Unbound, supra note 4, at 4-5. 
82 Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Crisis Governance in the Administrative State: 9/11 and the 
Financial Meltdown of 2008, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1613, 1614 (2009) (“In the modern administrative state, it 
is practically inevitable that legislators, judges, and the public will entrust the executive branch with 
sweeping power to manage serious crises of this sort.”); accord Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, 
Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 Yale L.J. 1170, 1204 (2007) (arguing that the executive is best 
placed to resolve difficult foreign affairs questions requiring judgments of policy and principle, and that the 
judiciary should defer to the executive based on its foreign policy expertise). 
83 Eric A. Posner, Adrian Vermeule, Emergencies and Democratic Failure, 92 Va. L. Rev. 1091, 1099 
(2006) (“There is no general reason to think that judges can do better than government at balancing security 
and liberty.”). 
84 Posner & Vermeule, Executive Unbound, supra note 4, at 5 (asserting that political checks will “block at 
least the most lurid forms of executive abuse”). 
85 Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 865, 867 (2007); see 
also Posner & Vermeule, Executive Unbound, supra note 4, at 151 (asserting vaguely that credibility will 
lead “voters and legislatives . . . to confer authority”). 
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Given this relentless optimism, the Posner-Vermeule iteration of the separation-of-
powers unsurprisingly leaves little space for a judicial role enforcing the structural 
constitution.   
The theoretical and empirical premises of this latter exogenous model have been 
challenged.86 It persists as a touchstone for analysis perhaps despite the fact that it does 
not accurately captures empirical regularities in the behavior of official actors or 
embodies a persuasive account of the relation of institutional design to social welfare. 
Nevertheless, it is admirably parsimonious, boldly stated, and provocative. In contrast, 
alternative exogenous approaches to the problem of interbranch interaction tend to be less 
compelling because, as Dean Magill explained, they “seek to understand the incentives of 
the actors who will exercise that power in a pointed enough way that it helps us 
comprehend how those powers will be exercised.”87 Such granular analysis of situated 
and specific dynamics provides a less breathtakingly synoptic view of legal and 
constitutional institutions—that is, it yields less by way of high theory—but may provide 
more insight about how the separation of powers works in practice.88  
B. Metatheory for the Separation of Powers  
 
The three schools of separation-of-power theory each offer different normative 
judgments about contemporary institutional dynamics, the extent of judicial review, and 
pathways for future reform. To adjudicate between theories of the separation of powers 
requires a vantage point from beyond any one individual theory from which more than 
one theory can be evaluated.  
 
                                                
86 For full-length criticisms of both the empirical and theoretical coordinates of the claims presented in the 
main text, see Aziz Z. Huq, Binding the Executive (by Law or by Politics), 79 U. Chi. L. Rev. 777 (2012); 
Richard H. Pildes, Law and the President, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1381 (2012). A central problem in the Posner-
Vermeule analysis is that it is commonly constructed on the basis of an apples-to-oranges comparison 
between the executive branch and other branches. Posner and Vermeule consistently model an ideal 
“rational and well informed” executive while looking at actual Congress and the courts. Attention to the 
actual construction and performance of executive branch institutions leads to very different conclusions. 
See Aziz Z. Huq, Structural Constitutionalism as Counterterrorism, 100 Calif. L. Rev. 887, 908 (2012)  
(identifying path-dependent institutional development and institutional blind-spots as significant drags on 
the efficiency of executive-branch action).   
87 Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches, supra note 68, at 659.  
88 It is appropriate and perhaps necessary here to disclose where to locate in this typology my own 
contributions to this field. In addition to criticisms of the Posner-Vermeule account, I have advanced two 
main points. First, arguing from an exogenous perspective, I have argued on welfarist grounds for a narrow 
view of the justiciability of separation-of-powers questions in favor of broader latitude among political 
officials to negotiate new institutional arrangements. See Huq, Negotiated Structural Constitution, supra 
note 62, at 1674-83; Aziz Z. Huq, Standing for the Structural Constitution, 99 Va. L. Rev. 1435 (2013) 
[hereinafter Huq, Standing]. Second, in harmony with Magill’s endorsement of more granular studies, I 
have developed more fine-grained, multi-method accounts of specific separation of powers dynamics 
concerning detainee policy and remedies. On detainees, see Aziz Z. Huq, The President and the Detainees, 
165 U. Pa. L. Rev. 499 (2017) [hereinafter Huq, President and Detainees]; Aziz Z. Huq, The Predicates of 
Military Detention at Guantánamo: The Role of Individual Acts and Affiliations, 13 J. Empirical L. Stud. 
567 (2016). On constitutional remedies, see Aziz Huq & Genevieve Lakier, The Triumph of Fault in Public 
Law, – Harv. L. Rev. – (forthcoming 2018); Aziz Z. Huq, Judicial Independence and the Rationing of 
Constitutional Remedies, 65 Duke L.J. 1 (2015).  
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This sort of ‘metatheoretical’ evaluative exercise—“meta” in the sense that it is an 
exercise in theorizing about theories—might be pursued from one of two perspectives, 
one more rewarding than the other. First, metatheory might proceed by establishing an 
independent vantage point from which various theories could be compared and 
contracted.89 In the separation-of-powers context, however, it is not at all clear there is 
shared ground of this kind. The second, more modest form of metatheoretical inquiry 
asks instead if there are empirical or normative concepts that are common to one or more 
thought. Rather than attempting a synoptic judgment of the validity of any given theory 
of the separation of powers, this kind of metatheory focuses on the more granular and 
manageable task of adjudicating between the different ways in which a given empirical or 
normative question is resolved across the different theories.  
 
As noted, there is an analogy to the field of metaethics in philosophy, which “is 
concerned to answer second-order non-moral questions, including (but not restricted to) 
questions about the semantics, metaphysics, and epistemology of moral thought and 
discourse.”90 Exemplary questions in metaethics, for example, would include whether 
there are such things as moral facts, or whether knowledge of such facts is possible. 
Thankfully, the metatheoretical questions raised by the separation of powers debate are 
more tractable than these. Indeed, isolating these cross-cutting concepts—and 
considering the different ways in which they are specified—provides new purchase on 
the evaluation of different theoretical claims and a means of evaluating Congress’s 
Constitution in particular. Even if it is not possible to reach a conclusive judgment on 
which theory is superior given the persistence of larger normative debates in respect to 
constitutional law, a focus on metatheory has the potential to at least narrow the scope of 
disagreement about the separation of powers.  
 
Three distinct metatheoretical questions can be teased out from the thicket of 
separation-of-powers theories canvassed above. These concern the model’s assumptions 
about the motives of official actors; the relevant sources of law; and the model’s 
assumptions about dynamics of equilibrium or change. The first of these is an empirical 
dispute (albeit one not always perceived as such). The second is profoundly normative. 
The final metatheoretical question rests on an empirical prediction about the way a 
complex governmental system will behave. I discuss each in turn. 
 
                                                
89 For the use of metatheory in this sense, see Dorf, supra note 11, at 597; Pursley, supra note 11 at 1337. A 
1990 student note uses the framing device of “metatheor[ies] of separation of powers,” but does so to refer 
to what I have called theories of the separation of powers. Edward Susolik, Note, Separation of Powers and 
Liberty: The Appointments Clause, Morrison v. Olson, and Rule of Law, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1515, 1527 
(1990). The sense of “metatheory” here is also somewhat distinct from what Brian Leiter calls “theoretical 
disagreement,” which involves “disagreeing about what most legal philosophers call the criteria of legal 
validity.” Brian Leiter, Explaining Theoretical Disagreement, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1215, 1216 (2009). The 
second species of metatheoretical disagreement I adumbrate below, concerning the sources of law, has this 
character. But my sense of the term “metatheory” is broader. 
90 Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons, Introduction, in Metaethics after Moore 1 (Terry Horgan and Mark 
Timmons, eds., 2006).  
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1.  Questions of Motive  
 
Any theory of the separation of powers requires an account of official motives. 
Not all the theories canvassed above explicitly recognize this, but it is true all the same. 
All agree that theories of separation of powers set out to describe, or to offer prescriptions 
for, a set of ongoing institutions staffed by individuals. They are hence constitutive, in the 
sense that they “create or define new forms of behavior”; they are only secondarily 
regulative in the sense of “regulat[ing] a pre-existing activity, an activity whose existence 
is logically independent of the rules.”91 The centrality of the task of delineating actual, 
formal institutions aligns the separation of powers with federalism. It also distinguishes 
the separation of powers from many other domains of constitutional law. Unlike the 
separation of powers, many other constitutional doctrines are plainly not constitutive of 
legal institutions in the first instance. The First Amendment’s speech and religion clauses, 
for example, presuppose the existence of an institutional press and organized churches.92 
Similarly, whereas the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and 
seizures may primarily regulate the police, it does not create the police. (Indeed, the 
urban police force postdates the Bill of Rights in the United States by some four 
decades.93) By sketching the contours of institutional role and authority, the separation of 
power necessarily rests on assumptions about motive—and in turn influences the 
substance of those motives.94 
   
Motive is a basic building block in the design of government institutions. The 
Constitution’s first three Articles hence articulate a series of roles into which specific 
individuals slot. The efficacy of that institutional articulation depends on the behavioral 
fact that specific individuals indeed do assume the roles limned in those Articles, and 
then assert attendant powers. The Constitution, in other words, is akin to a play: It 
provides official actors with a bare script. It does not compel a particular interpretation of 
that script. Moreover, like any great performance text, the Constitution makes room for 
many interpretations. As a result, motive is a central term for understanding the 
separation of powers because it is the motives of specific individuals that will determine 
how he or she responds to the role and powers constituted by one of the first three 
Articles in Constitution. It figures in questions about how powers will be deployed to 
combat or cooperate with other branches. And it informs predictions as to whether 
institutional role constraints will be embraced or resisted. 
                                                
91 John R. Searle, Speech Acts 33-34 (1969); accord Christopher Cherry, Regulative Rules and Constitutive 
Rules, 23 Phil. Q. 301 (1973). 
92 For an analysis of the role of institutions in First Amendment law, see Frederick Schauer, Towards an 
Institutional First Amendment, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 1256, 1268-69 (2005) (criticizing framing of the First 
Amendment as an individual entitlement); Frederick Schauer, Is There a Right to Academic Freedom?, 77 
U. Colo. L. Rev. 907, 925 (2006) (“An institutional understanding of the First Amendment is structured 
around the principle that certain institutions play special roles in serving the kinds of values that the First 
Amendment is most plausibly understood to protect.”). 
93 See David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 1165, 1202-08 (1999) (discussing 
historical origins of the police). 
94 One way in which institutional design shapes motives is through “selection effects,” whereby 
qualification rules alter the pool of anticipated applications for a position. Adrian Vermeule, Selection 




Rough generalizations can be offered to describe the assumptions about official 
motive animating the separation, balance, and exogenous models. Hence, separation 
models implicitly assume that the law permits and limits official behavior within each 
branch. The implication is not crisply spelled out, but it would make no sense to offer 
propositions about the extent of congressional war powers95 or the directive authority of 
the president in relation to principal officers96 in the absence of an expectation that the 
specific individuals were motivated by the law, i.e., motivated to exercise their duties and 
fulfill their roles as specified by the relevant legal material. The balance model, by 
contrast, often rests on the Madisonian assumption that “[t]he interests of the man must 
be connected with the constitutional rights of the place,”97 such that individuals staffing 
each branch should be expected to act on the basis of the interests of their home 
institution. Finally, the exogenous models discussed above98 take the view that officials 
act on political or partisan motives, which is framed as distinct and different from legal 
motives. The precise quality of a ‘political’ motive can be rendered in different ways. For 
example, Jack Goldsmith and Daryl Levinson predict the exploitation of the weak by the 
strong.99 Others seem to gesture at a more conventional, but more optimistic account of 
electoral responsiveness consistent with the canonical accounts of political representation 
in the political science literature.100   
 
The role of motive in separation-of-powers jurisprudence, moreover, is distinct 
from its function in other domains of constitutional law. Consider the prohibitions found 
in the Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment. Several provisions in that part of the 
Constitution make motive, or intent, a touchstone of constitutional infirmity.101 In effect, 
such prohibitions pick out a species of motivation familiar from the world and treat it as a 
fatal taint to state action. Such rules exclude some actions on the basis of motive, but 
otherwise have no implications for the range of legitimate official motivations. In other 
regulative contexts, motive does not bear on the validity of government action, but 
pertains to the availability of a judicial remedy. For example, Elena Kagan famously 
argued that First Amendment doctrine “comprises a series of tools to flush out illicit 
motives and to invalidate actions infected with them.” 102  In contrast, in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, the motivation of a state agent is not relevant to the 
constitutionality of their action.103 Rather, questions of intentionality become relevant 
                                                
95 Prakash, Sweeping Domestic War Powers, supra note 34, at 1367.  
96 Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 28, at 544,  
97 The Federalist No. 51, at 319-20 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick, ed., 1987) (advocating “giving to 
those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist 
encroachments of the others”). 
98 See supra text accompanying notes 69 to 88.  
99 Goldsmith & Levinson, supra note 79, at 1833. 
100 For a classic model of electoral responsiveness, see David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral 
Connection 13 (1974). 
101 See Aziz Z. Huq, Judging Discriminatory Intent, 103 Cornell L. Rev. -- (forthcoming 2018) (analyzing 
the role of intent in the context of the Religion Clauses and the Fourteenth Amendment). 
102 Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment 
Doctrine, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 413, 414 (1996). 
103 Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 539 (2014) (stating that a court “do[es] not examine the 
subjective understanding of the particular officer involved” in a challenged policing action). 
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when the Court turns to the question whether a remedy such as the exclusion of evidence 
or damages for a constitutional tort notwithstanding qualified immunity.104 It is only in 
the separation of powers context that the law plays the role of a careful and diligent 
gardener of souls, seeding and cultivating the springs of official action with the ambition 
of realizing a healthful and vigorous institutional ecosystem. It is only in the separation of 
powers, that is, where the causal effects of legal design upon official motives is central 
rather than incidental to the enterprise.105   
 
2.  The Sources of Law  
 
The three schools of theory described above diverge dramatically in respect to the 
relevant range of sources from which claims about the law can be derived, as well as the 
hierarchical scale along which such claims should be ordered. All draw on Philip 
Bobbitt’s quasi-canonical list of six “modalities” of argument in constitutional law; these 
operate as “the grammar of law, that system of logical constraints that the practices of 
legal activities have developed in our particular culture.106 Each modality turns on 
different sorts of evidence. Some are controversial.107 Separation of powers jurisprudence 
is hardly quarantined from these disputes. The tides, undercurrents, and squalls that 
afflict the wider scholarship and jurisprudence of constitutional interpretation hence upset 
the stability of separation-of-powers theory and law too. Still, debate over the sources of 
law in the separation-of-powers context has some bespoke qualities.   
 
To see this, consider the official assigned a novel role and new powers, whether 
as a result of an election or an appointment. The nature of those new roles and powers 
necessary depends in part on the existence of a shared understanding of the constituting 
force of the first three Articles. A person with a wholly idiosyncratic understanding of 
their role—e.g., a president who believed that he or she had authority to exile or execute 
political opponents—would not be cognizable (at least for now) as a constitutionally 
legible actor.108 Even if there is a repertoire of shared understandings about what a 
legislator or a president or a judge can or should do, the ensuing bundles of rules and 
                                                
104 See Huq, Judicial Independence, supra note 88, at 20-40 (documenting the pervasive use of a “fault” 
standard of objective culpability across constitutional remedies).  
105 Federalism, in contrast, generally takes the states as they are, and considers how the federal government 
then acts upon them.  
106 Philip Bobbitt, A Constitutional Interpretation 12-13, 24 (1991). 
107 Consider, for example, the status of precedent. Compare Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and 
Constitutional Adjudication, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 723, 748 (1988) (“Precedent is, of course, part of our 
understanding of what law is.”) with Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 Harv. 
J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 23, 24 (1994) (“In [some] circumstances . . . the practice of following precedent is not 
merely nonobligatory or a bad idea; it is affirmatively inconsistent with the federal Constitution.”). 
108 This is not to say that all claims of legal authority or prohibition that fall beyond shared understanding 
of a constitutional rule-set are illegible within the constitutional system, or irrelevant to its operation. To 
the contrary, claim-making and behavior at the boundary of the legal system can shape subsequent 
understandings of the law’s context. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System?, 80 
U. Chi. L. Rev. 1743 (2013).  
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powers is also likely to be alternatively incomplete, ambiguous in scope, or overtly 
contested in places.109  
 
A key question is how that repertoire is expanded or contracted. On the account of 
law associated with H.L.A. Hart (which I think largely correct), the litmus test to 
ascertain whether a norm is a rule of law as opposed to say, a convention, a norm of 
political life, or coincidental empirical regularity, is whether it is a social norm for a 
relevant group of legal officials.110 It is, therefore, a matter of social practice whether the 
official can appeal to one or another source of law.111 But social practice is neither static 
nor absolutely constraining. Accordingly, an official newly invested in one of the three 
branches has a degree of freedom about whether to hew closely to the already-inscribed 
contours of a role based on extant and uncontroversial sources of law,  or whether to kick 
against the pricks of convention by asserting new-fangled interpretations of novel sources 
of law.112 Here, the question of motive intersects with the selection of sources of law.   
 
There are a specific number of ways in which disputes about the sources of law in 
the separation-of-powers context diverge from such debates more generally. To begin 
with, consider the range of sources that validly inform a constitutional determination.113 It 
is quite possible (even probable) that separation-of-powers decisions are systematically 
decided by different actors from other constitutional questions—say, because separation-
of-powers are, all else being equal, less likely to be justiciable than an analog question of 
constitutional law. It is further likely that relevant actors systematically differ in the 
sources of law they deploy, and the manner in which they prioritize them. As a result of 
these variances, separation-of-powers jurisprudence will likely be characterized by a 
different distribution of source materials than other domains of constitutional law.    
 
More generally, there is a wide margin of disagreement about the extent to which 
the text (perhaps situated within its original Founding era context) can provide 
                                                
109 There is a useful analogy to the sociological concept of “habitus,” which is the “system of dispositions 
which acts as a mediation between structures and practices,” Pierre Bourdieu, Cultural Reproduction and 
Social Reproduction, in Culture: Critical Concepts in Sociology 63–94, 56 (Chris Jenks ed., 2003), or the 
related ideas of “culture” as a “toolkit” for certain “strategies of action” and that “both the influence and the 
fate of cultural meanings depend on the strategies of action they support. Ann Swidler, Culture in Action: 
Symbols and Strategies, 51 Am. Soc. Rev. 273, 273, 284 (1986). In the separation of powers context, where 
discretionary powers dominate specific ministerial obligations, these notions provide useful guides for 
thinking about the relation of law to observed behavior.  
110 Cf. Jules L. Coleman, Rules and Social Facts, 14 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 703, 722 (1991) (“[That] a 
particular rule of recognition that is the rule of recognition in a particular community is a social fact about 
that community.”). I take no position here on Raz’s more demanding “sources thesis,” which pertains to the 
permissible content of a rule of recognition. See Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and 
Morality 212 (1979). 
111 This is a controversial proposition. Scholars who offer strong, narrowing claims about the appropriate 
sources of law are likely to resist the claim that the validity of their claims is not a matter of objection facts 
but of coherence with a social practice that they are actively trying to shift or curate. Their view is a 
legitimate internal perspective on the law, and not a matter of false consciousness.     
112 Cf. Acts 26:14, King James Version.  
113 Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 885, 886 
(2003). 
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determinative answers.114 Such disagreements, to be sure, exist in other domains of law. 
There are exceptionally creative scholars and judges who dicker with the original 
understanding of “free speech” as a prohibition on prior restraints, and instead brocade a 
magnificent, extensive lattice of limits on both ex ante and ex post speech regulations out 
of the thin warp of original text and practice.111 But disagreement is especially profound 
in the separation of powers domain. To scholars working within the separation tradition, 
the resolving power of the first three Articles’ fine-spun and careful arrangement is 
crystal clear; to those in the balance tradition, it speaks in more muffled tones.112 To  my 
mind, there is a qualitative difference between this dispute about the resolving power of 
text and its original meaning and parallel disputes in other fields. By and large, my 
reading of the scholarship leaves me with the view that Free Speech, Fourth Amendment, 
and Equal Protection jurisprudences are by comparison far less preoccupied by the 
meaning of words in their eighteenth-century context than the literature on the separation 
of powers, although it is worth underscoring that this is a difference in degree and not in 
kind.  
 
In addition, relevant historical practice takes a different form and has a different 
valence in the separation of powers context. Historical practice can be a probative 
instantiation (and hence affirmance) of sound constitutional meaning, which at the limit, 
works as a definitive, even immobile “fixation” of that meaning. 115  Alternatively, 
historical practice operates as an aversive precedent, a dark mirror from which current 
constitutional practice properly recoils.116 Other axes of variation include timing (e.g., 
pre- or post-ratification); institutional location (e.g., executive-branch practice, versus 
sequential legislative action, versus judicial precedent), and stability (i.e., whether a 
practice was contested, and whether that contestation, in the courts or otherwise, proved 
successful).    
 
                                                
114 Adam M. Samaha, Levels of Generality, Constitutional Comedy, and Legal Design, 2013 U. Ill. L. Rev. 
1733, 1739 (2013) (noting that “the list of relevant constitutional sources is not fully settled. Agreement is 
solid for many source categories (such as clauses, history, and cases), but thoughtful people disagree over 
what else should be on the list (such as contemporary understandings, foreign law, and acquiescence)” 
(internal footnotes omitted)). 
111 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Foreward: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 26, 55 
(2000) (rejecting the “honest reading of the Constitution [that] leaves us with a First Amendment 
preventing prior restraint but providing no other protection of free expression”). 
112 See, e.g., Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 2, at 1167 (advancing textual case for a unitary executive at 
length), with Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 30, at 2 (describing that case as “just plain myth”). 
115 Nelson, Originalism, supra note 40, at 535 (“Although Madison conceded that the words used in the 
Constitution might well fall out of favor or acquire new shades of meaning in later usage, he was 
suggesting that their meaning in the Constitution would not change; once that meaning was ‘fixed,’ it 
should endure.” (emphasis omitted)); Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, After Recess: Historical Practice, 
Textual Ambiguity, and Constitutional Adverse Possession, 2014 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 41 (discussing “[t]he 
idea of fixation through long-standing acceptance of a practice”). 
116 Cf. Kim Lane Scheppele, Aspirational and Aversive Constitutionalism: The Case for Studying Cross-
Constitutional Influence Through Negative Models, 1 Int’l J. Const. L. 296 (2003) (describing how 
totalitarian, fascist, or Nazi governments functioned as aversive precedent for the U.S. Supreme Court in 
developing the modern constitutional law of criminal procedure). 
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Current constitutional law is replete with aversive historical precedent that 
providing a definitional point of contrast that orients current law.117 Aversive precedent 
logically fits more closely with the prohibitive force of many regulative constitutional 
provisions. In contrast, they are less useful for glossing the constitutive rules that make 
up the bulk of the separation of powers. Instead, as a recent flurry of academic interest 
attests, the idea of historical practice of some sort, or “gloss,” plays a particularly 
important role in the separation of powers context.118 As Alison LaCroix has pointed out, 
the term “historical gloss” is imprecise insofar as it might refer to “custom, tradition, 
prescription, or something else.”119 Even acknowledging that imprecision and consequent 
uncertainty, it remains the case that historical practice plays a larger role in determining 
the distribution of powers between branches than in other constitutional domains.     
 
Again, different theories have different metatheoretical predicates. Separation 
theorists tend to find more meaning embedded in the text’s seams, and so are more 
inclined to find in the early Republic’s bright white light some settling fixation of an 
ambiguous constitutional term. In contrast, balance theorists are less willing to find a 
dispositive textual settlement. Accordingly, they are more concerned with later practice. 
They are also more likely to embrace more recent policy innovations as appropriate 
responses to long-term trends. In contrast, exogenous models that hinge on politics of 
various forms generally attribute relatively little effect to law, hence sapping the sources-
of-law question of motivating force. Yet law implicitly remains central to their accounts 
insofar as they model officials as occupying, and acting on the basis, of legally defined 
roles. What sources illuminate the relevant constitutive law is a question not squarely 
answered in their work.   
 
Along other metrics, it bears noting, the use of historical practice in separation of 
powers law is not distinctive from what is observed in other parts of constitutional law. 
For instance, practice-based claims across the constitutional waterfront are made by 
drawing on both pre-ratification state, colonial, or English practice.120 Arguments are also 
often grounded in the behavior of officials in the early republic.121 And just as practice-
based settlements—or their judicial analog, written precedents—can prove of variable 
endurance in the separation of powers context,122 so, too, can legal settlements by judicial 
precedent or practice outside that domain be of varying quality and robustness. These 
cross-cutting continuities in debates about the sources of law unite most of constitutional 
law, and should not be ignored.  
                                                
117 For a discussion of the aversive precedent in the criminal procedure context, see William Stuntz, The 
Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 Yale L. J. 393, 396-403 (1995). 
118 See, e.g. Bradley & Morrison, Historical Gloss, supra note 16, at 418-19 . 
119 Alison L. LaCroix, Historical Gloss: A Primer, 126 Harv. L. Rev. F. 75, 77 (2013); see also Curtis A. 
Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, Constitutional Conventions, and the Judicial Separation of 
Powers, 105 Geo. L.J. 255, 262 (2017) (noting problems of threshold categorization, level of generality, 
and the sufficiency of interbranch acquiescence in the use of historical gloss).  
120 Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 33, at 265-79 (examining pre-ratification materials).  
121 Saikrishna Prakash, New Light on the Decision of 1789, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 1021, 1022 (2006) 
(describing Congress’s decisions about how to structure departments under the president in 1789 for the 
first time as one of “the most significant yet less-well-known constitutional law decisions”). 




3.  The Choice Between Equilibrium and Change Models 
 
An account of the separation of powers demands a theory of change or a theory of 
equilibrium. Although the resolution of constitutional questions outside the domain of 
separation of powers also necessarily raises some questions of chronological situation 
and interrelation, the role of time—and change over time—in the separation-of-powers 
context is distinctive when contrasted to other fields of constitutional law.   
 
The central temporal question in many fields of constitutional law concerns the 
level of generality at which a constitutional principle is understood.123 The Constitution 
can be interpreted as a relatively specific settlement of contestable institutional design 
questions. Alternatively, it could be viewed as “an initial framework for governance that 
sets politics in motion and must be filled out over time.”124 Temporality has little role if a 
relevant legal concept is defined in a low level of generality: Specific rules stand fast 
against the relentless current of time. In contrast, when the Constitution is understood as a 
relatively general settlement picking out relatively abstract values, pressing questions 
arise as to how best to evince “fidelity” to those principles over time.125 To give just one 
example, some scholars have argued that the fundamental rights protected under the 
Equal Protection Clause should be defined in relatively abstract terms, which will tend to 
result in new and perhaps unanticipated applications of the right over time.126 Others, 
predictably, disagree.127 
 
In one respect, the same question of levels of generality arises in the context of 
the separation of powers. For instance, Dean Manning has characterized the central 
question of all separation of powers jurisprudence as simply a matter of which level of 
generality is appropriate in reading the Constitution’s text.128 Consistent with Manning’s 
framing, many (but hardly all) separation-of-powers disputes implicate the question 
whether to understand an issue at a specific or an abstract level of generality. Opting for 
abstraction forces the question of how to translate an eighteenth-century idea two-plus 
centuries forward in time.129 In defining a fundamental right under the Equal Protection 
                                                
123 Cf. Louis Michael Seidman & Mark V. Tushnet, Remnants of Belief: Contemporary Constitutional 
Issues 40-42 (1996) (introducing the idea of levels of generality as a variable in constitutional 
interpretation); Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 
U. Chi. L. Rev. 1057, 1058 (1990) (making this claim in the fundamental rights context). That is not to say 
that the idea of levels of generality is a simple one. Cf. Samaha, supra note 114, at 1743 (flagging three 
ways in which the level of generality can be calibrated: “abstractness, breadth, and dynamism”).  
124 Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 549, 550 
(2009). 
125 For the canonical account of “fidelity” as a concept that requires changing application over time, see 
Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 395 (1995). 
126 Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 1057, 1058 (1990) (“The more abstractly one states the already-protected right, the more likely it 
becomes that the claimed right will fall within its protection.”). 
127 John Safranek & Stephen Safranek, Finding Rights Specifically, 111 Penn St. L. Rev. 945, 979 (2007) 
(“The Supreme Court must eschew general rights and seek refuge in principled specification.”). 
128 Manning, supra note 36, at 2006-07  
129 See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 30, at 4-5.  
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Clause or defining one of the rights in the 1791 Amendments, therefore, an interpreter 
might opt for a specific or an abstract understanding of the relevant interest. Having done 
so, the relevant legal interest remains stable, even if it must be translated forward into 
new contexts using new applications. That is, one is always applying the same conception 
of (say) equal protection, or privacy, or the right to marry, in light of new social or 
technological circumstances.   
But the separation of powers implicates the choice between equilibrium and 
change in another, distinct, and bespoke way. For the separation of powers compels the 
following question: How (if at all) does the arrangement of institutions created by the 
Constitution’s first three Articles maintain its stability over time? All agree that the 
separation of powers constitutes a series of formal institutions inhabited by specific 
individuals acting on diverse motives over time. Given that, there is inevitably a question 
whether those individuals’ cumulative actions will push institutional arrangements out of 
their initial roles, or out of alignment, over time. Further, there is a question whether that 
prospect of such disequilibration should provoke consternation or alternatively should be 
embraced.  
 
A simple model of the separation of powers shows how the question of 
equilibrium over time arises. A person vested with a role or powers by dint of the 
Constitution’s first three Articles must decide how to deploy new-found authority. 
Depending on their motives, and their understanding of valid source of law, this person 
will either hew to past understandings of roles and the appropriate deployment of powers, 
or alternatively innovate in their conception of the role and their deployments of official 
authority. Their choice might create the risk of changing, and hence durably 
destabilizing, existing institutional arrangements. Predicating the effects of such choice, 
moreover, is complicated by the fact that background social, economic, and political 
conditions are themselves unstable. Hewing to a historical model of appropriate behavior 
against a changing external context might be itself be destabilizing. Forgetting 
Heraclitus’s river, one might be accidently oust the old in favor of an unknown new via 
an obdurate fidelity to obsolete behaviors.130  
 
The question whether the separation of powers should be understood as a stable 
equilibrium or as a dynamic system is squarely acknowledged and confronted in the 
political science literature, but largely ignored in the theoretically inclined legal 
scholarship canvassed above. As I shall discuss in more detail in Part III,131 political 
scientists and historians have explicitly diverged over whether the constitutional system 
should be characterized as a stable equilibrium that persists over time, or whether it 
should be seen as an evolving composite of institutional formation moving at different 
                                                
130 Flaherty makes such an argument to support the legislative veto. Flaherty, supra note 47, at 1834 
(“Given that balance was a primary purpose for dividing government authority, and given further that the 
executive has supplanted the legislature as the branch posing the greatest threat to this balance, it follows 
that any jurist faithful to the past should applaud, not deride, legislative attempts to maintain that balance, 
especially when those attempts appear in part of a package delegating still more power to the executive.”). 
131 See infra text accompanying notes 218 to 226. 
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temporal registers.132 No parallel formulation can be located in the legal scholarship. 
Nevertheless, to offer once more a rough generalization, separation theorists tend to 
assert that the stability of legal forms in the separation-of-powers is desirable, and 
despairing when that stability is perceived not only as abandoned but also beyond 
plausible grasp.133 In contrast, balance theorists perceive a need for shifting specific 
institutional arrangements as a means to preserve the systemic, architectural qualities they 
value. Finally, exogenous theorists such as Posner and Vermeule tend to embrace 
change—and in particular the metastatic growth of the executive branch—as a welcome 
adaption to the complexity of governance in the contemporary United States.  
  
Varying judgments over the extent of separation-of-powers stability, finally, are 
likely to correlate with differences in judgments about relevant sources of law. The latter 
can be “characterized as relatively dynamic or relatively static,” depending on whether 
they “require or forbid rethinking [the] proper specification or application.”134 In this 
fashion, different metatheoretical questions are again entangled with each other.   
 
C. Tying Theory and Metatheory Together 
 
This Part has aimed to provide a minimum level of baseline clarity for a 
consideration of Congress’s Constitution by charting a topology of contemporary debates 
on the separation of powers. To begin with, this entails a mapping of theories of the 
separation of powers. I proposed three categories—separation, balance, and exogenous 
models. Further clarity on these debates is gained by slicing across the various theories to 
shuck out certain common questions of empirical fact or normative theory with respect to 
which the theories vary. I have proposed again three metatheoretical categories of 
interest—on matters of motive, sources of law, and equilibrium versus change.      
 
In contrast, my account of the metatheoretical foundations of the separation-of-
powers does not focus on the doctrine’s ‘purpose’ in the sense of identifying a specific 
normative value immanent in the constitutional scheme as a touchstone of analysis. The 
possible “purposes” of the separation of powers include efficiency, the prevention of 
tyranny, democratic accountability, and deliberation. Purpose-based arguments claims are 
common. 135  But they are singularly unfruitful as starting coordinates for mapping 
                                                
132 Compare Sonia Mittal & Barry R. Weingast, Self-Enforcing Constitutions: With an Application to 
Democratic Stability In America's First Century, 29 J. L. Econ. & Org. 278, 278-79 (2011) [hereinafter 
Mittal & Weingast, Self-Enforcing Constitutions] (modeling the constitutional system as a stable “self-
enforcing” system); Barry R. Weingast, The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law, 91 
Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 245 (1997) (same), with Karen Orren & Stephen Skowronek, The Search for American 
Political Development 108-18 (2004) [hereinafter Orren & Skowronek, Search for American] (describing 
the “intercurrence” of varying political regimes). Equilibrium models are also suited to describe single 
institutions such as legislatures. See Kenneth A. Shepsle, Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in 
Multidimensional Voting Models, 23 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 27, 27 (1979) (offering a model of legislative 
behavior that results in “equilibrium”). 
133 See, e.g., Lawson, Rise and Rise, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 1254 (concluding, 
morosely, that “one must choose between the Constitution and the administrative state”).  
134 Samaha, supra note 114, at 1753.  
135 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 Va. L. 
Rev. 1045, 1059 (2001) (observing “[t]hat the separation of powers . . . may have the specific purpose of 
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theoretical disagreement about the separation of powers. This is because a theory of the 
separation of powers will rarely be bottomed on the claim that there is one, and only one, 
value that explains all separation-of-powers controversies. Rather, plausible theories of 
the separation of powers tend to acknowledge the fact that the design of national 
government institutions reflects many normative ends pursued simultaneously.136 The 
multiplicity of ends, and the absence of any obvious way to make trade-offs between 
them, means that merely invoking the ‘purposes’ of the separation of powers rarely does 
much meaningful analytic work.  
 
In contrast, separation, balance and exogenous models are all better understood as 
analytic devices for working though the necessary trade-offs between the normative ends 
implicated in separation-of-powers law. That is, the normative trade-offs involved in a 
purpose-focused analysis can only be executed by calibrating the metatheoretical 
elements of the separation of powers.  
 
To be clear, an analytic quarantining of metatheoretical claims is no panacea for 
the interminable disputes over the proper specification of the separation of powers. 
Certainly, it yields no immediate resolution of intractable first-order issues. One reason 
for this is that the three metatheoretical questions identified here differ importantly in 
tractability. There is a fact of the matter, however difficult to extract, about the motives of 
discrete government officials. Those motives, importantly, might also change over 
time.137  
It is less clear whether this is a fact of the matter about the sources of law at a 
given historical moment. If one follows H.L.A. Hart in positing that the ultimate “rule of 
recognition,” a rule that picks out valid sources of law, is a convergent social practice 
among officials,138 then careful empirical inquiry might unpack the precise criteria used 
to identify the law. Nevertheless, at least in the American context, it seems tolerably clear 
that there is a high degree of scholarly and juristic disagreement about both the 
potentially relevant sources of constitutional law and also the appropriate rule of priority 
when evaluating competing pieces of evidence. Legal scholars often participate in that 
disagreement even as they purport to objectively describe it. Finally, the descriptive claim 
that a constitutional system is in equilibrium implicates a mix of both empirical and 
normative judgments. At minimum, it entails a normative specification of the relevant 
                                                                                                                                            
promoting a dialogue among different voices even with regard to foreign policy issues”); Jessica Korn, The 
Power of Separation 14-26 (1996) (emphasizing effective governance, as well as preventing tyranny, as 
goals of separation of powers); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 
421, 432-33 (1987) (describing efficiency and prevention of tyranny as two chief purposes of separation of 
powers). 
136 See Huq & Michaels, supra note 5, at 382-91 (describing “normative pluralism” of the separation of 
power). 
137 See infra text accompanying notes 171 to 178.  
138 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 116 (1994) (characterizing the “rule of recognition as specifying the 
criteria of legal validity and its rules of change within a system of laws”); Kenneth Einar Himma, Situating 
Dworkin: The Logical Space Between Legal Positivism and Natural Law Theory, 27 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 
41, 68-69 (2002) (glossing Hart to hold that “the behavioral element that gives rise to the rule of 
recognition is convergent behavior on the part of the officials in making, changing, and adjudicating law”).  
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criteria along which stability is defined, and the bounds of permissible fluctuation within 
homeostasis. That is, one must say what kind of change counts—and why.  
Complicating analysis further, these three metatheoretical questions collide in 
practice. For instance, the quality of officials’ motives is likely to inform their attitude 
toward the law. As a result, it will likely inflect their judgment of what constitutes a valid 
source of law. Motive and the sources of law are hence endogenous. Moreover, the extent 
of constitutional equilibrium will influence mold officials’ incentives and the plausible 
sources of law. Where institutional change as a consequence of exogenous partisan or 
social pressures is perceived as proceeding at a rapid rather than a gentle clip, for 
example, officials may be disinclined to invest deeply in legal knowledge. Older sources 
of law become less plainly trenchant. Motives hence change, and perhaps with them the 
relevant sources of law.  
Nevertheless, attention to these metatheoretical questions is a way of gaining 
better purchase on precisely why and how scholars disagree about the separation of 
powers. It is also a pathway to better understanding and appreciation of new contributions 
to the scholarly literature—such as Congress’s Constitution.      
II. THEORY AND THE APPLICATION OF THEORY IN CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION 
 
After that rather length excursus into somewhat abstract theory, this Part turns to 
Congress’s Constitution. It begins by characterizing the theoretical premises of the book 
in terms of the tripartite schema elaborated in Part I, before then examining the book’s 
selection and elaboration of case studies. The subsequent Part then turns to metatheory.  
 
I begin by flagging the book’s weighty merits—merits I shall inevitably short-
change in the effort to press upon the book’s core analytic claims. Congress’s 
Constitution is a sophisticated and carefully documented account of elements of 
constitutional law that receive insufficient attention. Beyond its rich theorizing, it 
advances six insightful historical case studies. In a sequence of chapters each focused on 
a distinct legislative power, Chafetz provides rich portrayals of those powers’ 
development. Each is a terrific read. Of particular interest is the manner in which he 
explores the English parliamentary forbearers to legislative powers such as Speech and 
Debate immunity (pp. 203-25), authority over internal disciplinary matters (pp. 235-59), 
and the legislative power of contempt (pp.158-71).139 Chafetz is adept at covering 
decades, even centuries, of institutional ground in a narrow compass of pages, and few 
readers will read the book without profiting from his synoptic vision and detailed 
knowledge. As a book designed for a reasonably informed professional audience, on an 
important but oft-neglected element of constitutional law, Congress’s Constitution is a 
clear success.138 Disagreement with its theoretical premises and metatheoretical 
                                                
139 The latter is extensively discussed in an insightful precursor article, Josh Chafetz, Executive Branch 
Contempt of Congress, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1083 (2009).  
138 Chafetz states that his goal, inter alia, is to ensure that “for each of the congressional powers discussed, 
the reader should end the chapter with a sense of how it has developed over time, [and] why it has 
developed as it has.” (p. 6). In these respects, he succeeds admirably.   
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implications, which is perhaps inevitable, should thus not be confused for a more general 
indictment of the high quality of Chafetz’s historical and analytic work. 
 
A. The Theory of Constitutional Politics 
 
Congress’s Constitution comprises two main contributions. The first is a theory of 
the separation of powers with special attention to the legislature’s role. The second is the 
series of case studies of three “hard” and three “soft” congressional powers: 
appropriations, executive-branch personnel control; contempt; speech and debate 
immunities; internal disciplinary devices; and intracameral rules. This review focuses on 
the first contribution, although I will analyze elements of the case studies that are relevant 
to, or in tension with, the theoretical part of the book.  
 
That theoretical contribution of Congress’s Constitution has three core 
components. 140  Isolating them facilitates the comparison of Chafetz’s theoretical 
armature—call it the constitutional politics account of the separation of powers—with 
the antecedent versions charted in Part I. The three elements provide answers to the three 
basic metatheoretical questions of the separation of powers outlined in Part II—motive, 
the sources of law, and the question of equilibrium.  
 
First, the constitutional politics account traces a causal vector from “politics,” 
which comprises “political behaviors and interactions,” forward to “political power” and 
from thence to the resolution of legal questions to do with “the distributional 
governmental authority within a political community” (pp.16-17).  A negative implication 
of this assertion is that questions about interbranch relations are “not answerable by the 
reference to the normal tools of constitutional interpretation” such as “[t]ext, history, 
structure, and precedent” (p. 16). 141  Chafetz’s causal account also entails that the 
settlement of interbranch disputes is “nonhierarchical” and indeterminate in duration in 
the sense that there is no entity with power to issue dispositive settlements (pp.18-19). 
This is, to be clear, a bold and striking response to what I have called the ‘sources of law’ 
question.  
 
The second element of the constitutional politics account concerns the nature of 
the “political behavior and interactions” that are at the root of the causal chain that 
ultimately yields outcomes to separation-of-powers disputes. In brief, Chafetz 
characterizes the law of separation-of-powers is an epiphenomenal residue from battles 
over power in the shape of freedom from the binding constraints of diffuse public 
judgment. This second claim, as just formulated, is opaque, and needs some unpacking.  
 
According to Chafetz, interbranch disputes are resolved “locally and contingently 
as they arise, often via compromise or negotiation, and without binding implications for 
                                                
140 Chafetz offers a different four-part breakdown of his claim (pp. 18-19). This account, focuses on the 
implications, rather than the causal core of the claim.  
141 For a discussion of whether the case studies follow through on this approach, see infra text 
accompanying notes 196 to 197. 
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the future” (p. 20).142 Such settlements are reached in the “public sphere”; they are part of 
a complex, mechanistically variegated, and perhaps evolving domain in which “dialogic 
and highly mediated” processes of “public political interaction” occurs (p. 21).143 The net 
result of this public process is “trust,” manifested in persistent public support for an 
individual official that can survive observed decisions by that official inconsistent with 
the first-order policy preferences of members of the public (pp. 21-22). The more trust an 
institution accrues, the more leeway the public will give that institution and hence “the 
more power that institution has” (p.23). A notoriously slippery concept,144 power is 
implicitly defined here in Congress’s Constitution as the extent of relational discretion 
obtaining between a political institution and a diffuse democratic public. As such, it 
seemingly provides Chafetz’s answer to the metatheoretical question of motive that 
striates separation-of-powers scholarship: Officials are motivated by the desire to win the 
trust of the public insofar as the latter enlarges their discretionary policy-making 
authority.   
 
The third element of the constitutional politics account is an optimistic toleration 
for nondisputive and democratically credentialed change hardwired into Chafetz’s theory. 
Given institutional actors’ dependence upon public trust, their strategies for claiming 
institutional prerogative and for making counter-moves are necessarily bounded. They 
must be “judicious” and not “maximal” (p. 24; see also p. 308). The system as a whole is 
“dependent on the will of the people,” (p. 34), which in the final analysis determines its 
actions.  
 
This can fairly characterized as embodying an optimistic judgment on Chafetz’s 
part for two reasons. First, it fosters a reassuringly normatively pedigree for the ensuing 
structural arrangements and the concrete policy outcomes flowing from them. The 
absence of legitimation from an original constitutional source is offset by the public-
facing character of internet contestation and its outcomes. Second, even as the 
constitutional politics model explicitly recognizes and embraces the inevitably of 
institutional evolution (for examples of this recognition, see pp. 25, 42, 312-13), there is 
no suggestion that this process will get out of hand.145 To be sure, the envisaged process 
of institutional change has “no logical stopping point” (p. 18). Certainly, it did not calcify 
into a ‘fixed’ pose circa 1791. But there is no hint here of what Thoreau called “the 
unhandselled globe” in its raw and bloody glory; there is rather an eminently habitable, if 
                                                
142 This is parallel to a central claim in Huq, Negotiated Structural Constitution, supra note 62, at 1600 
(“Both states and branches engage in such bargaining routinely, notwithstanding scholarly inattention to the 
practice.”).  
143 See also p. 22 (“Political trust—and with it political power—arises out of . . . conversations between 
political elites and the public.”).  
144 For competing approaches to understanding the term, compare Jean Bethke Elshtain, Power Trips and 
Other Journeys: Essays in Feminism as Civic Discourse 136 (1990) (“Power is a form of compulsion 
exerted by the already (relatively) powerful upon one another within official political institutions designed 
to promote the aims and interests of competing groups. It is of, by, and for elites.”), with Michel Foucault, 
Afterword: The Subject and Power, in Hubert L. Dreyfus & Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond 
Structuralism and Hermeneutics 208, 217 (2d ed., 1983) (“[P]ower as such does not exist.”).  
145 Chafetz also endorses specific instances of institutional transformation, such as the move from fees and 
bounties to salaries in the eighteenth century federal bureaucracy (p. 73).   
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somewhat chaotic, “garden.” 146  More prosaically stated, the constitutional politics 
account imagines institutional change as bounded by a sensible and sensitizing popular 
will.147 It treats each branch as vocalizing a different element of the polity in ways that 
“enhance the quality of deliberation” (pp. 309-10). Even if beset by “conflict, noise, and 
clamor” (p. 314), therefore, the resulting cacophony is liable to generate a stable, 
representative, and non-tyrannical form of government (p.303).  
 
This element of the theory hence responds to the deeper metatheoretical question 
of equilibrium versus change: The constitutional politics account favors change, but only 
such change as can be titrated through a reassuringly democratic and hence “judicious” 
apparatus. It is this model of change, I think, that implicitly sustains Chafetz’s conclusion 
that the American separation of powers system is “more fully representative, more 
deliberation promoting, and more resistant to tyrannical or autocratic power” than other 
common constitutional systems (p. 303). It is a model of change that is, moreover, 
founded on the legitimating assumption that the forces that determine institutional 
outcome are public facing and in some fashion reflective of public sentiment.   
 
There is, however, an internal tension torqueing this third plank of the 
constitutional politics account. Simply put, the mechanism of institutional change Chafetz 
posits is not self-stabilizing. In the constitutional politics accounts, interbranch conflict 
persists over time, and “the branch that successfully engages the public will accrete 
power over time” (p.14). But this descriptive claim appears to undermine two other key 
elements of Chafetz’s argument. First, if one branch accretes asymmetrically high levels 
of power in relation to the other, at some point interbranch conflict will end because the 
powerful branch will always or almost always win. Chafetz, however, seems to assume 
that conflict itself is a stable-state equilibrium in which all branches continue to play a 
meaningful role.148 Second, and relatedly, the bulk of the book is devoted to the 
proposition that Congress has the capacity to be a player equal to the executive (see, e.g., 
p. 42). But the theory implies that, if the executive has gained the upper hand today, this 
is because it has played its cards better than Congress. The theory then provides no 
reason to disturb this result—as Chafetz explicitly seeks to do.  
 
Both puzzles can be solved only by bringing into a normative notion of balance—
and an agent that does the balancing. Indeed, Chafetz does precisely this when he predicts 
that “any actor attempting to aggrandize her powers beyond tolerable limits can expect to 
find herself opposed by other actors” (p. 312). By focus on the ambiguity of the adjective 
“tolerable” in this formulation, it quickly becomes clear this dictum bears more than a 
passing resemblance to a familiar strand of balance theory.149  That is, public conceptions 
                                                
146 Henry David Thoreau, The Maine Woods: A Fully Annotated Edition 63 (Jeffrey S Cramer, ed., 2009). 
147 For instance, the “feasibility and success” of constitutional innovation at an institutional level are said to 
“depend on how successful [officials] are at engaging in the public sphere” (p. 38).  
148 It is otherwise hard to know why he insists that there is “no a priori determinable rule” for resolving 
interbranch conflicts (p. 305). If one branch kept accreting power until it was hegemonic, the rule of 
decision for such conflicts would, in fact, be quite simple.  
149 To be clear, Chafetz does not disavow the balance label, but he also does not align himself with past 
theoretical claims.   
 35 
of “tolerable” conflict are assumed to have a stabilizing, balancing effect upon 
interbranch dynamics—even though the constitutional politics account itself provides no 
a priori reason for thinking that the public will hold or act upon such preferences. Hence, 
the theory silently smuggles in a set of quite controversial assumptions about the 
preferences of the democratic public about the nature of interbranch conflict.150  
 
To summarize then, how is the theory animating Congress’s Constitution new and 
distinct from the three general approaches sketched in Part I? In brief, the constitutional 
politics account might well be characterized as an ambitious hybrid of the balance and 
exogenous models. Its greatest distance, in intellectual terms, is from separation models. 
The constitutional politics account is at odds with the methodological premises of most 
separation theorists insofar as Chafetz, while conceding that some parts of the written text 
are “static” irrespective of politics (p.17), emphasizes the endogeneity of constitutional 
rules to transient partisan contestation (e.g., 20, 25-26).   
 
In contrast, the constitutional politics account intertwines elements of both the 
balance and the exogenous models into a patterning that bodes to be novel. A central 
theme of the book is that “there is nothing inherent in Congress’s constitutional place that 
dooms it to play second (or third) fiddle” (p.42). Moreover, as noted above, the 
constitutional politics account assumes a stable state of interbranch conflict in which no 
one branch becomes hegemonic (p. 305) and implies a kind of self-stabilizing mechanism 
that kicks into gear whenever one branch gets too big for its britches (p. 312). It seems 
that public opinion of a certain sort must fuel that mechanism At the same time, the 
theory does not rest on any claim that officials within each branch will always or often 
act upon the basis of institutional loyalties (cf. pp. 30-31, 311). Rather, it locates official 
actors within an explicitly political field in the sense of rooting power in the context of 
their relations with the public.  
 
One rather glib way of summarizing Chafetz’s theory—surely an excessively 
reductionist one that does not do justice to its ambition or sophistication—is to say that it 
is a retooling of the balance model (in which dynamic interactions between the branches 
yield healthful sparring over policy, and collaterally prevent any one branch over-
reaching) with the exogenous model’s insights into the motives and operative context of 
government bolted uneasily to its side. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
I should also add that this account of Chafetz’s theory slights certain parts of Congress’s 
Constitution. For example, I have highlighted Chafetz’s assertion that his theoretical account is distinctive 
insofar as it is “multiplicity based” because it “aims to highlight the ways in which claims of authority 
multiply and overlap in a nonhierarchical constitutional order” (p.18).  See also Josh Chafetz, A Fourth 
Way? Bringing Politics Back into Recess Appointments (and the Rest of the Separation of Powers, Too), 
64 Duke L.J. Online 161, 162-63 (2015); Josh Chafetz, Multiplicity in Federalism and the Separation of 
Powers, 120 Yale L.J. 1084, 1112-28 (2011).  But the propositions that (1) the separation of powers 
comprises a plurality of actors, and (2) those actors all make constitutional claims that overlap and 
sometimes conflict, are both commonplace in theoretical work on the separation of powers. Hence, it is not 
its basis in multiplicity that renders the constitutional politics account a distinctive and a new contribution 
to the literature. I have chosen to accent what is truly new in the theory. 
150 See infra text accompanying notes 185 to 186. 
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B. From Theory to Application? 
 
Before turning to the heart of my critical analysis—drilling down on the 
metatheoretical predicates of Congress’s Constitution—some preliminary scaffolding 
concerning the six exhaustive and rich historical case studies is warranted. In particular, 
some attention is merited to the question why these particular cases should be isolated, 
and how their analysis unfolds in rough parallel. 
 
Readers familiar with conventional debates about Congress’s powers will be 
immediately struck by the fact that Chafetz’s particular choice of case studies deliberately 
omits Congress’s authority to promulgate substantive rules pursuant to various provisions 
of Article I, Article III, and Article IV.151 At first blush, this selection of topics raises 
obvious questions. There is a close relation between the powers he discusses and the ones 
he omits.  Appropriations, for example, might be a close substitute for pure regulation, in 
particular when conditions are attached to an expenditure.152 The internal disciplinary 
choices of Congress interact with its power to promulgate ethics and lobbying rules 
without running afoul of the First Amendment.153 And it is hard to see how the power to 
appropriate can be disentangled from Congress’s authority under the first two clauses of 
Article I, Section 8, to tax and borrow money.154 Even if their borders were crisper, these 
heterogeneous powers would perhaps not snap into immediate focus as a logical and 
obvious whole that invites a singular analytic lens.155 Readers hence may be saddled with 
a nagging concern that other relevant congressional authorities are playing out at the 
periphery of the book’s vision.   
 
                                                
151 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 4 (Congress’s power to alter state electoral rules); § 8, cls. 3-18 (enumerated 
powers; § 10, cl. 2 (regulation of state taxation); Art III, §§ 1 & 2 (regulation of lower federal courts and 
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction; Art IV, § 1 (full faith and credit regulation); § 3 (territorial 
regulation). 
152 Todd D. Peterson, Controlling the Federal Courts Through the Appropriations Process, 1998 Wis. L. 
Rev. 993, 1008 (1998) (“Through the use of explicitly targeted restrictions on appropriations, Congress can 
regulate the conduct of the other branches and frequently can impose its will in spite of executive or 
judicial opposition.”). The scope of Congress’s power to use conditions on federal spending to achieve 
policy ends arises most often when states are recipients of those funds. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-
Leveraging Principle and the Spending Clause after NFIB, 101 Geo. L.J. 861, 862-63 (2013).  
153 For an argument that the current structure of lobbying is in violation of the Petition Clause of the First 
Amendment, see Maggie Mckinley, Lobbying and the Petition Clause, 68 Stan. L. Rev. 1131, 1132-42 
(2016).  
154 U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cls. 1 & 2. On the interaction of these clauses, see Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. 
Dorf, How to Choose the Least Unconstitutional Option: Lessons for the President (and Others) from the 
Debt Ceiling Standoff, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 1175, 1197-1202 (2012) (analyzing the relationship between 
the powers to tax, spend, and borrow).  
155 Chafetz asserts that he is considering only “specific constitutional tools that Congress has at its disposal 
in its interactions with the other branches.” (p. 3). But this is not quite right. Certainly, he begins with an 
example of interbranch conflict involving the judiciary (p.  9). But as a whole, his book has rather little to 
say about “Congress's power to withdraw jurisdiction from the federal courts as a means of shielding 
questions about the legality of official conduct from judicial review.” Fallon, Jurisdiction-Stripping, supra 
note 21, at 1047. Where the courts do enter the picture, it is to criticize their meddling in Congress-
executive relations (e.g., pp. 182-90). 
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The justification for Chafetz’s selection, I think, flows from his larger normative 
project rather than a functional homology among the chosen topics. Perhaps the best way 
to understand his subject-matter is in simply terms of Chafetz’s wish to offer an account 
of “congressional Power (p. 26) not simply in the abstract, but in relation to the executive 
branch, which dominates contemporary commentary. The six case studies of 
congressional power concern those instruments most relevant to Congress’s interactions 
with its Article II counterpart.156 The case studies on this view are instrumental to, and 
hence subordinate to, Chafetz’s claim that the “separation-of-powers system privileges 
judicious, rather than maximal, combativeness” between the political branches (p. 
311).157  
 
Correlatively, to the extent a theory emerges from his analysis, it is best 
understood as being nested in, and potentially reflective of, an abiding concern with 
interactions between Congress and the executive. It is by no means clear, however, that 
general propositions that hold as between that political-branch binary would be 
descriptively accurate or predictively valid as applied to other interbranch dyads.158  
 
When viewed in that light, the case studies are united by a series of coordinates 
that traverse all six—shared points of analytic framing that help orient the subsequent 
exploration of metatheoretical themes. In that regard, four points of analytic commonality 
across the case studies are worth flagging here because they set the stage for a more 
detailed analysis.  
 
First, each of the six case studies is organized as a brisk historical narrative, each 
of which “begin[s] in earnest in England around the turn of the seventeenth century” (p. 
4). This history matters, but not because it is consciously recalled by contemporary 
political actors. (Today most can separate their Wolseys from their Mores only if they 
have perused their Mantels.159) So why does history matter? Although the justification for 
the particular historical frame is not extensively developed, it seems fair to say that 
Chafetz envisages a “developmental” process in which later iterations of institutions are 
in some fashion “deeply rooted” in earlier versions beginning in the Tudor period (pp. 4-
5). Both the historical frame and the specific language employed to explain that frame 
                                                
156 In contrast, the difficult question of how and when the states can influence congressional behavior, and 
thus when congressional actions raise federalism concerns, is outside the book’s scope. For a skeptical view 
of the leading general theories, see Aziz Z. Huq, Does the Logic of Collective Action Explain Federalism 
Doctrine?, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 217 (2014).   
157 This is in accord with recent findings that (for example) “investigations offer Congress a check on 
presidential aggrandizement that is often more effective than that provided by its legislating function.” 
Douglas L. Kriner & Eric Schickler, Investigating the President: Congressional Checks on Presidential 
Power 9 (2017). 
158 For instance, in other contexts, the influence of one branch (say, Congress) on another (say, the courts), 
could be mediated by the independent actions of the third branch. For an account along these lines, see Tara 
Leigh Grove, The Article II Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 250, 252 (2012) 
(arguing that “the executive branch has a strong incentive to use this constitutional authority to oppose 
efforts to curb federal jurisdiction”).   
159 If this seems obscure, that’s the point. Cf. Hillary Mantel, Wolf Hall (2009); Hillary Mantel, Bring Up 
the Bodies (2012). No richer, or more delightfully sordid and brutal an account of the Tudor politics can be 
imagined. 
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suggest that historical experience here are posited as implicitly relevant to the resolution 
of subsequent and contemporary disputes.160 This is in tension, obviously, with Chafetz’s 
claim that specific institutional settlements are “without binding implications for the 
future” (p. 20).    
 
Second, with some important exceptions addressed below, the case studies have a 
teleological flavor. Thus, while Chafetz acknowledges some back-and-forth in 
institutional development, there is nevertheless an overall impression of positive 
evolution toward more and more desirable institutional forms. For example, Chafetz tells 
of the struggle between the King and Parliament over the latter’s procedural workings, 
and then portrays state constitutions as embodying learning from that history (p. 278) and 
the U.S. Constitution as “evinc[ing] a similar desire” (p. 279). That is, British history 
holds lessons—and those lessons were absorbed and successfully acted upon in the new 
world. More generally, the tenor of his accounts is consistent with a gradual unfolding of 
an immanent rationality of institutional design—a story with more than a trace of a 
Hegelian, teleological rationality. This in turn operates as a predicate to a generally 
optimistic orientation of institutional development implicitly adopted by the 
constitutional politics account. 
 
Third—and in some tension with the previous observation—in the course of the 
historical narratives Chafetz does not limit himself to describing the positions reached in 
the context of specific, “local[]” disputes (p. 20). Rather, he repeatedly demurs to the 
manner in which specific disputes have been resolved (see, e.g., pp. 120, 182, 255). 
Hence, in discussing Congress’s decisions in the late twentieth century to seek the 
support of the federal judiciary in extracting information from the executive 
notwithstanding claims of executive privilege, he notes critically that “Congress thus 
simultaneously diminish[es] its own standing in the public sphere and enhance[s] the 
courts’ standing.” (p. 195). When discussing judicial precedent respecting the scope of 
the President’s necessary Article II authority to terminate officials, Chafetz criticizes 
formalist decisions by the Supreme Court limiting Congress’s power to structure the 
federal bureaucracy on the ground that they “rob Congress of central elements of its 
ability to structure and monitor government offices” (p.147).161 An implication of these 
                                                
160 I am not a historian, but should flag a methodological concern here likely to resonate most among 
historians. I think it is fair to say that Chafetz’s accounts are framed as fairly convention narratives of 
political conflict in which one side wins, the other loses, and as a result some fairly clear understanding of 
institutional power arises. Much as I was taught Tudor English as a schoolboy in London, historical battles 
come to seem to be a sequence of soccer matches with crisp scores (“Wolsey—one, More—nil”). But are 
understandings of institutional settlement, or the lessons drawn from institutional conflicts, really so 
ambiguous? Reviewing a spate of historical books on executive power as it was understood at the time of 
Founding, John Fabian Witt flags that such matters were “rarely settled and almost always hotly contested.” 
John Fabian Witt, Anglo-American Empire and the Crisis of the Legal Frame (Will the Real British Empire 
Please Stand Up?), 120 Harv. L. Rev. 754, 766 (2007). While the schoolboy in me appreciated the limber 
narrative, the historian manqué wondered about its dearth of depth. In particular, the very different nature 
of parliamentary democracy before the Great Reform Act of 1832 receives insufficient attention. For a 
detailed study of the period at the center of Chafetz’s narrative, see David L. Smith & Graham E. Seel, 
Crown and Parliaments, 1558-1689 (2001).  
161 An example of such a formalist decision is Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 116 (1926); see also 
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722 (1986) (invalidating budgeting lock-box mechanisms designed to 
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passages is that the theory being brought to bear to generate the case studies does not 
hold that “political behavior and interactions” are the sole determinants of lawful or 
desirable outcomes in separation-of-powers conflicts (pp.16-17).162 Some outcomes, even 
if sought by Congress, are normatively unmoored. An implication of this is that there 
must be an exogenously given normative benchmark against which local and contingent 
outcomes are measured—a benchmark that does not emerge immediately on superficial 
examination of the constitutional politics account.    
 
Fourth, notice that both of the aforementioned examples of institution teleology 
gone awry hinge on the inapt interventions by the federal courts. So when should judges 
intervene, consistent with the constitutional politics account?  It is hard to say. There is 
ambiguity in Congress’s Constitution as to how, and indeed whether, courts should 
resolve separation-of-powers disputes. At times, Chafetz is fiercely critical of the judicial 
role, and presses against justiciability (see, e.g., p. 182). At other times, he seems to 
recognize that some legal questions inevitably come before a judge. For instance, he 
concedes that courts have a “perhaps greater” role in respect to Speech and Debate 
Clause questions because “members are most likely to be ‘questioned’ in a courtroom” 
(p. 226).161 And he contends that Congress “should consider leaning more heavily” on its 
power to directly enforce its contempt power through arrest and imprisonment (p. 198). 
Presumably, the ensuing imprisonments would be amenable to a court’s review via a 
habeas corpus action of the kind used to challenge earlier imprisonments by the sergeant-
in-arms (see, e.g., p. 178). 
 
Aside from such ad hoc judgments, however, there is no general account of when 
separation-of-power questions should be justificable before an Article III bench. To be 
sure, Chafetz does suggest that no judicial opinion is ever final because “there is no 
separation-of-power equivalent of the Supremacy Clause” such that “massively iterated” 
conflict over a legal question can continue even if there has been a putatively legal 
settlement (p.19). But I do not find this a compelling answer. Today, most decisions by 
the Supreme Court—except those that track abiding and emotional fractures of public 
opinion—are treated by most participants in American politics as legally dispositive. 
Even if these opinions are undermined by resistance from other branches, or even lower 
court judges) they are not typically “massively iterated” through continuing conflict in 
the public sphere except for the occasional effort to reopen an issue before the Supreme 
Court.164 There is, for example, far less contestation now over recess appointments now 
the Supreme Court has addressed the question.163 In practice, that is, I take judicial 
                                                                                                                                            
control budgetary excesses). Consistent with Barkow and Waldron, see supra notes 64 and 65, it is worth 
asking whether formalism on behalf of some other branch’s power (e.g., the judiciary’s) merits a different 
result. It is not clear from Chafetz’s analysis what he would say on this score.   
162 Nether of the aforementioned condemnations, moreover, can be explained by labeling the relevant 
branch’s behavior ‘injudicious.’  
161 See also pp. 258-59 (writing with approval of the manner in which a judicial challenge to the exclusion 
of Rep. Adam Clayton Powell was handled).   
164 For a case study of a Supreme Court opinion that was largely negated in practice—but through lower-
court defiance and executive foot-dragging—and yet remains a binding rule of law, see Huq, President and 
the Detainees, supra note 88, at 501-11.  
163 NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014). 
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supremacy to be more established than Chafetz suggests.164 Hence, I think there is far 
more settlement of separation-of-powers questions that he allows.165 Perhaps this is 
unwise. But without a systematic challenge to the glacial hold of judicial supremacy on 
the American constitutional imagination, Chafetz’s shrugging off of Article III settlement 
is not descriptively compelling.  
 
Congress’s Constitution also skirts the Article III standing question raised when 
an individual files suit on the ground that a government action causing a cognizable harm 
should be enjoined not because the harm cannot lawfully be inflicted on her, but rather 
because the action violates some separation-of-powers protocol. The Court has answered 
this question in the affirmative.166 An eccentric minority of scholars has objected.167 
Because it offers no account of when courts should intervene in this crucial swathe of 
cases, the constitutional politics account leaves ambiguous the question of which of the 
legal issues at stake would be resolved through the give-and-take of informal political 
tussling and which would be resolved through the more formal canalizing instrument of 
judicial review.  
 
The ‘when’ of judicial review matters in part because it helps clarify thinking 
about the ‘how’ of judicial review. The constitutional politics account offers some 
recommendations as to when courts should step aside (p. 182). But it is framed as a 
description, albeit a normatively freighted one, of how separation-of-powers disputes are 
resolved from what Hart called the “external . . . point of view,” of “an observer who 
does not himself accept them.”168 But judges do not decide cases from an external point 
of view. They rather understand themselves as “member[s] of the group which accepts 
and uses [legal rules] as guides to conduct.”169 It is not clear whether Chafetz thinks that 
judges should be using the same analytic approach to separation-of-powers questions as 
he endorses. It is far from clear that they could or should. More generally, there are 
                                                
164 There is no generally accepted metric of judicial supremacy, and anecdotal evidence of judicial 
supremacy (or its absence) would not be decisive. Rather, I suspect that Chafetz and I simply have a 
reasonable disagreement about the normative heft and rootedness of judicial supremacy today. Although I 
agree with Chafetz that judicial supremacy is on balance less desirable than many think, I recognize that 
my view is a minority position.  
165 This position is consistent with the now increasingly common claim that the Court’s “constitutional 
decision-making is inextricably intertwined with the will of the people, channeling the views of political 
and popular majorities in numerous ways.” Corinna Barrett Lain, Soft Supremacy, 58 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 
1609, 1612 (2017). Indeed, the interaction of judicial and popular preferences helps explain the durability 
of judicial settlement in the first instance.  
166 See Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2365 (2011) (stating that “individuals . . . are protected by 
the operations of separation of powers”).  
167 See, e.g., Huq, Standing, supra note 88, at 1514-23 (recommending reforms to Article III standing 
doctrine).   
168 Hart, supra note 136, at 89. More precisely, Chafetz takes a “hermeneutic” point of view, which “seeks 
to describe the law . . . by reference to the insider's point of view,” in particular by “attending to the 
attitudes of the members of the group.” Scott J. Shapiro, What Is the Internal Point of View?, 75 Fordham 
L. Rev. 1157, 1159 (2006).  
169 Hart, supra note 136, at 89.  
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powerful reasons why the operation of constitutional canons and analytic methods would 
vary by institutional context that Congress’s Constitution does not address.170 
 
This absence of systematic answers to the “when” and “how” questions of judicial 
review puzzles. The constitutional politics account, that is, explains how “nonhierarchical 
interbranch contestation,” when handled “judiciously,” leads to desirable outcomes (pp. 
18-19), but says little about when “judicious” also means “judicial.” So long as courts 
deploy different sources of law from the ones Chafetz endorses, the theory will be off-
kilter. Thus, even if courts rely on interbranch practice in resolving disputes, they 
additionally turn to “[t]ext, history, structure, and precedent” (p.16) in ways that the 
constitutional politics account declines to endorse. In consequence, where judicial review 
begins (wherever that may be), the theory falls silent, or at least sings with a muted 
tongue.     
 
In sum, there are continuities—both in terms of shared methodological moves and 
also common gaps—aligning the six case studies. Picking out these commonalities 
illuminates the relationship of the case studies to the theory (as well as their divergences). 
It hence sets the stage for a consideration of the metatheoretical foundations of the 
account.     
 
III.  SEPARATION OF POWERS METATHEORY IN CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION 
 
 Is the constitutional politics account founded upon a set of consistent and 
defensible presuppositions in respective to the empirical facts of institutional behavior 
and the normative questions raised by observed regularities in official conduct?  This Part 
applies the tripartite framework of metatheoretical inquiry to the constitutional politics 
account. Its ancillary ambition is to demonstrate the utility of an analysis that focuses 
upon the predicate assumptions of separation-of-powers theory. This task is aided by the 
fact that Chafetz, unlike the other leading theorists of the separation of powers, is 
admirably candid and clear about his methodological presuppositions. The very fact of 
such candor is a contribution to the quality of jurisprudential debates in this domain.  
 
Although Part II’s exposition of the constitutional politics theory began with 
sources of law, before moving to motives, it makes more sense here to begin with the 
question of what motivates official actors, before turning to questions of sources of law, 
and then the choice between equilibrium and change as a baseline assumption.   
 
A.  Motive  
 
The question of official motive in the theorization of the separation of powers is a 
difficult and subtle one for two reasons. First, the motives of specific actors invested with 
                                                
170 See, e.g., Aziz Huq, Enforcing (But Not Defending) “Unconstitutional” Laws, 98 Va. L. Rev. 1001, 
1001-05 (2012) (distinguishing between executive-branch obligations in respect to individual rights and 
structural constitutional questions); Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive 
Branch, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1189, 1239-58  (2006) (suggesting different treatment of the avoidance canon 
in the executive-branch context).   
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official authority are likely to vary substantially by time and by institutional locus. 
Second, official motives are endogenous to the choice of institutional design. Judgments 
about the permissible range of institutional design options therefore alter the quality of 
official motives. I first develop these points in more detail, and then consider motive’s 
role in the constitutional politics account before finally turning to a related question of 
what counts as ‘power’ in Chafetz’s account.  
 
It is helpful to begin with a simple, if destabilizing, observation: The motives and 
preferences of official actors in a branch of government do not remain static over time. 
Nor can it be assumed that those motives are constant between branches. Consider for 
example the narrow question whether members of Congress are likely to engage debate 
about, and be influenced by, legal and especially constitutional matters. On the one hand, 
David Currie’s sedulous historical work has demonstrated that early congresses seriously 
debated a “breathtaking variety of constitutional issues great and small.” 171  More 
recently, a former representative and federal judge concluded that legislative debate does 
not explore the constitutional implications of pending legislation; and, at best, Congress 
does an uneven job of considering the constitutionality of the statutes it adopts.172 The 
leading work in political science also suggests that legislators pursue a variety of ends 
simultaneously, sometimes trading ends off against each other.173 Constitutional concerns 
do not take consistent priority, and the strength of transient, nonlegal concerns will ebb 
and flow over time.  
The manner and extent to which members of Congress attend to various legal and 
non-legal ends, moreover, changes over time because the institution itself develops.174 As 
Michael Gerhardt has explained, the range of opportunities that members of Congress 
have for exercising judgments in respect to constitutional questions depends on the 
institutional structures of congressional deliberation. Gerhardt underscores the role of not 
just committees but also “informal practices, norms, and traditions.”175 These are all these 
channels for deliberation on legal and constitutional issues that have shifted over time. To 
the contrary, as Chafetz explores in some detail, “committees were an important part of 
cameral ordering from the beginning” but have undergone dramatic changes since 1789 
                                                
171 David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Federalist Period, 1789-1801, at 239 (1997).  
172 Abner J. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61 N.C. L. Rev. 587, 
587-88, 610 (1983).  
173 The classic work is Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Congressmen in Committees 1 (1973). For a rare example of 
legal scholars that consciously adopts Fenno’s insights, see Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, 
Institutional Design of A Thayerian Congress, 50 Duke L.J. 1277, 1288 (2001) (treating “legislators as 
maximizing a complex utility function, in which constitutional considerations are one argument”).  
174 Changes to the external electoral environment—in the form of different forms of campaigning, 
campaign financing, the varying effect of partisanship with the choice of primary structure—all add further 
complications to an effort to predict legislators’ motives. See R. Douglas Arnold, The Electoral 
Connection, Age 40, in Governing in a Polarized Age: Elections, Parties and Political Representation in 
America 29 (Alan S. Gerber & Eric Schickler, eds., 2017) (“What has changed—and what will continue to 
change—is the turbulence of the political waters through which legislators navigate their careers [and 
noting several new forms of complexity in the electoral environment].”). Given the complexity already 
identified, I bracket these considerations henceforth. 
175 Michael J. Gerhardt, Non-Judicial Precedent, 61 Vand. L. Rev. 713, 738 (2008). 
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(p. 282).176 More generally, the “industrial organization of Congress” reflects a dynamic 
“constructed environment within which legislators bargain with one another in order to 
facilitate their individual and collective goals.”177 This environment does not stay still.  In 
the words of David Mayhew, examining “two and a quarter centuries” of congressional 
operation, what “impresse[s]” is “the system’s flexibility, its variety, its capacity to turn 
on a dime.”178  
 Substantially parallel points could be made about the judiciary and the executive. 
Neither has remained static over time. Changes in their internal operation modulate the 
strength of legalistic compulsions in comparison to other motivational drives. This is 
obviously true with respect to the executive, but also true of the judiciary. Hence, even in 
the absence of a “separation-of-powers equivalent to the Supremacy Clause,” (p. 19) the 
Supreme Court has ebbed and flowed in the extent to which it has asserted a final 
authority to settle disputed questions of constitutional law.179 The institutional apparatus, 
in terms of administrative operations, lobbying power, and sheer, on-the-ground 
infrastructure available to the judiciary has dramatically changed over time.180 This has 
changed its capacity to take the Constitution seriously, as well as altering the range of 
voices that can influence its decision-making process.   
 
A theory of the separation of powers that seeks to move from a descriptive 
account of how the branches do behave to a prescriptive vision about how they should 
behave needs to come to terms with the mutability and endogeneity of official motives. 
To his credit, Chafetz does not claim that there is one single kind of motive that explains 
official action across time and between branches. Nevertheless, he does not offer a 
general statement on what motivates members of Congress (or, for that matter, officials 
within the executive and judicial branches) most of the time, or in the instances with 
which he is concerned. Nor does he address the question of motivational change in a 
dynamic perspective.181  
 
At the same time, a dissonance emerges within what he does say with respect to 
official motivation in the book’s theory section. On the one hand, the central thrust of 
                                                
176 See also Fenno, supra note 173, at 94-114 (exploring historical importance of congressional 
committees).  
177 Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New 
Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Its Interpretation, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1417, 1431–32 (2003); 
see also Barry R. Weingast & William J. Marshall, The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why 
Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets, 96 J. Pol. Econ. 132, 132-37 (1988) (providing a 
theory of legislators based on the theory of firms and contractual institutions).  
178 David R. Mayhew, The Imprint of Congress 99 (2017).  
179 On the historical genealogy of these claims, and their frequency within the Court’s docket, see Aziz Z. 
Huq, When Was Judicial Self-Restraint?, 100 Calif. L. Rev. 579, 584-86 (2012) (summarizing path of 
judicial review from 1800 to 2000).  
180 For a synoptic historical account, see Justin Crowe, Building the Judiciary: Law, Courts, and the Politics 
of Constitutional Development (2012). 
181 But it is worth noting that some of the historical narratives bespeak not “constitutional politics” at work, 
but a relatively narrow-gauge version of individual self-interest. For example, when Member of Parliament 
Richard Strode persuaded his colleagues to enact Strode’s Act, annulling several money judgments against 
him and barring actions that “vexed or troubled” a member, we can be fairly confident mere public-
spiritedness was not at work (p. 203). 
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Chafetz’s theoretical chapter is to posit political actors engaged in a dialogic process of 
building and expending public trust, leading and being led, by their constituents (e.g., p. 
22). This suggests that legislative motives—perhaps more so than executive incentives—
will be shaped by their public-facing interactions with constituents and their parleys with 
other branches. But a somewhat different, and more nuanced, account of legislative 
motives surfaces as Chafetz responds in the subsequent chapter to the claim tendered by 
Daryl Levinson and Richard Pildes that partisanship dominates the calculations of 
members of Congress (p. 28-35). Addressing this position, Chafetz asserts that “members 
of Congress do, on some occasions, care about their chambers power, per se” (pp. 30-31), 
and further recognizes “the motivating power of partisanship” (p.35). Although the latter 
claim can be fitted within Chafetz’s dialogic account of constitutional politics, the former 
claim sits more uneasily therein. At the same time, there is reasonable evidence to 
suggest that institutional loyalties do occasionally bite, and moreover that, while they are 
at a nadir within the legislative branch, they are more apparent within both the executive 
branch and the judiciary.182 It is unclear from the constitutional politics account how, 
when, or why such motives would arise.  
 
One possible response to these critiques is that Chafetz’s account of dialogic 
interaction between officials and the public accounts for and includes many kinds of 
motives, including partisan and institutional ones (p.  42). But this leaves the theory with 
such a vague and open-ended account of official motives that it could be used to justify 
any prediction, and hence any normative prescription, concerning legislative behavior. 
Stated another way, the claim that there is “public focused” and “nonhierarchical” 
interbranch contestation, coupled to a sufficiently vague and indeterminate understanding 
of institutional motives, can support a wide range of predictions about how branch-
against-branch conflict will play out, and thus a wide range of normative 
recommendations. ‘Political stuff happens’ is simply not much of a theory.  
 
In addition, the theory’s reliance on public “opinion” (p.22) presents two 
considerable difficulties. The first difficulty is that is not at all clear how often, or how 
powerfully, public opinion shapes official action in practice. Congress’s Constitution 
presents no empirical data on this point. It relies on anecdote. Chafetz employs the Senate 
hearings on the nomination of Robert Bork to a seat on the Supreme Court as an example 
of dynamic interactions between the public and officials over institutional roles (pp. 22-
23). But it is telling that the subsequent case studies are not overflowing with parallel 
examples of overt public contestation over institutional power. Nor does he provide 
evidence that absolute levels of public opinion decisively influence official behavior. 
This is a point of some importance given recent work that suggests that it is changes in 
levels of public support, and not their absolute levels, that influence official decisions.183 
If these studies hold true, there is some cause for skepticism of the claim that free-
floating public opinion will operate as a stabilizing ballast to institutional behavior. If 
                                                
182 See David Fontana & Aziz Z. Huq, Institutional Loyalties in Constitutional Law, 84 U. Chi. L. Rev. – 
(forthcoming 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2940769.   
183 See James A. Stimsom, Tides of Consent: How Public Opinion Shapes American Politics, xvi-xvii 
(2004) (“It is movement that matters. Politicians ask, ‘How will the public respond?’ . . . .” (emphasis in 
original omitted)). 
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legislators simply care about avoid downticks in public opinion, they gain considerable 
leeway in separation-of-powers interactions simply by supporting popular taxation or 
spending measures to offset such variation.184  
 
A second difficulty abides in the assertion that “separation-of-powers system 
privileges judicious, rather than maximal, combativeness” (p.311). There is nothing in 
Congress’s Constitution that explains why the public should demand sensible forms of 
contestation and condemn hazardous ones (however defined). As noted previous,185 
Chafetz implies that the public has some kind of innate sense of what counts as 
appropriate interbranch conduct. This requires that pivotal members of the public never 
value “maximal” partisanship over forms of institutional hardball that do enduring 
damage to institutions. The available empirical evidence, however, suggests that the 
public may value outcomes over institutional process.186 Today, more than most instants 
in recent political history, claims that moderation will inevitably triumph over extremism 
ring very hollow.  No “invisible hand,” it instead seems, guarantees the wisdom or 
judiciousness of official action guided by public sentiment—at least unless one think that 
the public is made up of reasonably minded law professors.187  
 
Finally, it is worth noting another element of the constitutional politics account 
that bears on the question of motivation, albeit perhaps in a way that compounds rather 
than dilutes the aforementioned concern of insufficient theoretical specification. The 
notion of political power that is central to Chafetz’s analysis is, to say the least, an 
unorthodox one. Power is commonly understood as the capacity to exercise influence 
over another so that he or she take actions that would not otherwise be undertaken.188 As 
I understand him, Chafetz conceptualizes power as a sort of license to exercise discretion 
                                                
184 In addition, one might here draw attention to the large volume of political-science scholarship that 
problematizes the idea of a “public” to which Congress is faithful, substituting in its place a critical portrait 
of a distinctively regressive pattern of democratic responsiveness. See, e.g., Larry M. Bartels, Unequal 
Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age (2008); Martin Gilens, Affluence and 
Influence: Economic Inequality and Political Power in America (2012); Jacob S. Hacker & Paul Pierson, 
Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer--and Turned Its Back on the Middle 
Class (2010); Kay Lehman Schlozman, Sidney Verba & Henry E. Brady, The Unheavenly Chorus: 
Unequal Political Voice and the Broken Promise of American Democracy (2012). Were I to credit 
Chafetz’s theory of public facing contestation more, this would be the basis of a distinct objection.    
185 See supra text accompanying note 138. 
186 See David Fontana & Donald Braman, Judicial Backlash or Just Backlash? Evidence from A National 
Experiment, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 731, 734 (2012) (concluding, based on national experimental evidence, 
that variance in normative judgments “can be explained by whether a given citizen views the Court's 
decision or Congress's legislation as threatening or privileging her core worldview”). 
187 For a definition of invisible-hand arguments, see Adrian Vermeule, The System of the Constitution 70, 
73-80 (2011) (defining an invisible-hand argument as one in which an “overall system . . . produces a good 
that none of its components can individually produce, and that none of its components may even intend to 
produce,” and critiquing their use in legal scholarship). I hasten to add that I make no claim that law 
professors are all reasonable, let alone wise or judicious. This is, after all, not a work of fiction.  
188 Cf. Elshtain, supra note 152, at 136; see also Steven Lukes, Introduction, in Power: Readings in Social 
and Political Theory 2 (Steven Lukes, ed., 1996) (citing Max Weber’s definition of power as “the 
probability that an actor in a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite 
resistance, regardless of the basis on which that probability rests” (citation omitted)); id. (citing Robert 
Dahl’s definition of power: “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B 
would not otherwise do.” (citation omitted)).  
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in relation to a baseline state of compulsory compliance with popular opinion. That is, 
power is conceptualized as freedom from public opinion, even as Chafetz acknowledges 
that political leaders also shape public opinion.  
At the very least, this definition of power is orthogonal to—and thus ignores—the 
extent to which the institutional design of a branch either enables or inhibits actions. For 
example, on this definition of power, the growth in federal infrastructure—in the sheer 
number of officers, personnel, and funds—over the twentieth century is not itself a 
source of power, but a result of power. Likewise, the Supreme Court’s authority to define 
its own certiorari docket189—and hence to exercise control over the range of issues the 
Justices resolve or avoid—is apparently not a source of ‘power.’190 This seems rather 
implausible to me.191  
Contra Chafetz, therefore, not all ‘power’ (as that term is commonly understood) 
flows from a relationship with the democratic public. There are many elements of 
institutional design, including sheer institutional size, and subtle agenda-control tools, 
that meaningfully change power-relationships. One implication of such an analysis is 
this: If Chafetz is correct that official actors take decisions that reflect in important part a 
wish to accrue power, and if power is not exclusively pursued in the public sphere, then it 
follows that their strategies and behaviors cannot be understood in a way that is wholly 
“public focused” (p. 20). Rather, it would be necessary to attend to a far more complex 
“thick political surround”192 within and outside government to understand the ways in 
which institutional actors seek, acquire, and expend power. And if the sources of official 
power are not exhausted by public-facing dynamics, then the outcomes of institutional 
conflict cannot be legitimated by appeal to their popular pedigree. The moderating 
assumption of the constitutional politics account instead must fail.  
B. Sources of Law 
 
 As detailed in Part II.A, the constitutional politics account rests upon a clear and 
explicit account of the relative important of various sources of law. Chafetz decisively 
rejects the separation model’s focus upon text and original meaning, instead accentuating 
practice and the local solutions reached in respect to specific interbranch disputes. 
Building on the discussion in Part II.B, I begin the analysis here by pressing upon an 
internal contradiction within constitutional politics account’s working. I then draw back 
to ask whether Chafetz has offered an account of something cognizable as ‘law’ (rather 
than sheer politics). Finally, I turn to consider the relation between the constitutional 
politics model and recent explorations of the role of ‘convention’ in American law.  
                                                
189 See Evarts Act, Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, §6, 26 Stat. 826, 828; see also Act of Dec. 23, 1914, ch. 2, 
38 Stat. 790; Judiciary Act of 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-415, 43 Stat. 936. That authority, moreover, is but one 
element in a long series of institutional transformations that have augmented the federal judiciary’s 
freedom of maneuver since the late eighteenth-century. See Huq, Judicial Independence, supra note 88, at 
53-55 (summarizing that history in terms of comparative institutional power). 
190 See Aziz Z. Huq, The Constitutional Law of Agenda Control, 104 Calif. L. Rev. 1401, 1433-38 (2016) 
(discussing the effect of the judiciary’s agenda-control powers). 
191 Cf. p. 41 (“[T]he American judiciary is undeniably powerful.”); id. at 333 n.88 (same). 
192 Huq & Michaels, supra note 5, at 391.  
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As a threshold matter, there is a potentially unraveling tension between the role 
motives play in the theory section of Congress’s Constitution and their place in the case 
studies. This tension hinges on the role of “historical gloss,” or past institutional practice, 
as a source of legal rules.193 Theory and case studies of constitutional politics point in 
different directions as to whether historical gloss counts as ‘law,’ leaving a murky 
ambiguity on what has become a cynosure of separation-of-powers theorizing of late.  
 
This needs to be unpacked.  Recall first that Chafetz’s theory suggests that 
separation-of-powers law is a seething and unstable broth of volatile compounds (pp. 18-
19). The field of strategic action is in “constant flux” (p. 25). “[U]ncertainty, instability, 
and unpredictability” are the order of the day (pp. 312-14). Solutions, to the extent they 
are realized, exist only “locally and contingently” and “without binding implications for 
the future” (p. 20). This is the separation of powers as a quantum universe, where 
perceptions collapse institutional wave-functions into instantaneously fixed particulars, 
where spooky (public) action at a distance takes the place of the smooth, Cartesian action 
of a Newtonian atomic universe.194 
 
But a famous property of quantum theory is that its rather uncanny effects—its 
instabilities, its paradoxes, and its inversion of intuitive causation—all vanish as one 
moves from the subatomic to the world of discernable clumps of atoms and molecules.195 
So it is too with a constitutional politics approach as one moves from theory to 
observable studies. For the case studies are solidly upholstered, Victorian manses in 
comparison to the churning mire predicted by the theory. To begin with, contra the 
posited theory, the case studies imply that history does matter, over and over again. If the 
theoretical assertion of history’s irrelevance did in fact hold, three-quarters of Chafetz’s 
own text would be a nullity. Settlements that he embraces, and ones he abjures, instead 
prove enduring across decades or even centuries.196 Theory and case studies, therefore, 
are at odds.  
 
                                                
193 For definitions, see Bradley & Morrison, Historical Gloss, supra note 16, at 418-19; LaCroix, supra note 
119, at 77.  
194 For a strikingly different view of Congress that emphasizes “stability,” see David R. Mayhew, 
America’s Congress: Actions in the Public Sphere James Madison through Newt Gingrich 216-17 (2000). 
195 For an elegant explanation, see Brian Cox & Jeff Forshaw, The Quantum Universe: (And Why Anything 
that Can Happen, Does) 4-13 (2012).   
196 For example, Chafetz canvasses a familiar history of the initial creation of government departments and 
Tenure in Office Acts of 1820 and 1867 (pp. 100-22), as a basis to draw a general conclusion about 
Congress’s power to “structure and monitor government offices” (p. 147). History thus is treated as 
evidence of the existence of a lawful authority pursuant to Article I. In discussing the contempt power, the 
historical proposition that “[almost from the beginning, the houses of Congress have punished non-
members,” (p. 172) segues by imperceptible steps into the normative proposition that such power is “at 
least as essential for the houses of Congress” as for the courts (p. 180). It is hard to read this passage as 
doing anything other than deriving normativity from history. And talk of how the English Bill of Rights 
“enshrined a strong conception of the speech and debate privilege” a conception “picked up” by American 
constitutional designers (p. 210) is superficially a claim about constitutional backdrops, but in substance is 
a claim that history’s lessons have normative force today by dint of their role in motivating specific 
constitutional texts. 
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More puzzling, his case studies are trimmed with all the accoutrements of 
standard-form argumentation familiar to all constitutional scholars in a fashion that is 
quite at odds with Chafetz’s avowed abjuration of such sources of law (p.16). On one 
page of Congress’s Constitution, for example, a reader finds in quick succession excerpts 
not only from the Constitution but also from the Articles of Confederation, James 
Wilson’s lectures, and Thomas Jefferson’s missives (p. 211; see also p. 241). The 
Federalist Papers, of course, play a comfortably familiar supporting role (see e.g., pp. 57, 
66, 99-100, 145, 279)—the Statler and Waldorf of constitutional analysis. Select judicial 
precedent, when it fits Chafetz’s purposes, is described as resting on “forcible” ground (p. 
215), even as other rulings are distinguished and dickered away (p. 120).197 This invests 
history with a ballasting gravity, escapable when the theorist deems necessary, but 
constraining nonetheless.    
 
It is difficult to square this aspect of the case studies with Chafetz’s theory. Rather 
than trying to do so, perhaps it is better to ask whether the assumptions of the theory or 
the case studies fare better when studied closely. In fact, neither reflects a fully satisfying 
approach to the sources-of-law question.    
 
To begin with, it is not at all clear that Chafetz’s theoretical account is really an 
account of law as that term is conventionally understood. That is, if historically 
antecedent settlements of institutional conflict are “without binding implications for the 
future,” (p. 20), are they in any sense sources of law? Would not constitutional history 
simply comprise a meaningless drizzle of spot trades, or alternatively a pattern of 
interbranch defalcations, each reflecting only the momentary relations of an ongoing war 
of position between the branches? All sound and fury signifying naught, history would 
have no binding, no guiding, and no moral force today. This seems a denial of law—
whether formulated as rule or standard—in favor of something I think most would label 
raw politics. In this regard, Chafetz might be glossed as migrating, widdershins, to the 
position held by Dean Manning—to the effect that there is no law once one proceeds 
beyond the strict and narrow confines of specific text.198 
 
On the other hand, if we judge the constitutional politics account by what it does 
(case studies) rather than what it says (theory),199 two important questions snap into 
focus: How does fact become law? And should we understand such sources as law, or 
instead as species of ‘convention’ as that term has come to be used in constitutional 
scholarship? 
 
                                                
197 See also supra Part II.B. (noting the force of history, and the selection between endorsed and disfavored 
precedent).   
198 Compare p. 12 (stating that “no doubt there are a number of . . . relatively stable separation-of-powers 
provisions . . . [b]ut a lot more is up for grabs than we commonly realize”), with Manning, supra note 36, at 
1948-49 (contending for “a clause-centered approach” that rejects any “freestanding separation of powers 
doctrine”).    
199 Another reason to prefer this interpretation is that it improves the fit between Chafetz’s views and 
currently existing practice: In a legal system such as ours wherein the normative gravity of the past is 
immediately and extensively evident, this lacuna means constitutional politics does not provide an accurate 
description (or even an approximate description) of current practice. 
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First, Chafetz provides no account of how the fact of institutional clashes and 
institutional settlements precipitate into law. That is, he does not explain the relationship 
between “Faktizität und Geltung,” or facticity and validity.200 A theory that takes 
subsequent institutional practice as salient must offer some account of how the ‘fact’ of 
an institutional settlement or stalemate is transformed into a normative postulate within 
the system of constitutional law that exercises a binding force on intertemporally distant 
actors. It must answer the question of how “the realms of ‘real’ and ‘right’ interact in a 
social or political order over time.”201 
This is a question that arises and must be answered separately for judicial 
precedent,202 for historical gloss,203 and even for the normative force of ‘tradition’ (where 
the latter is defined as a pattern of historical behavior by governmental and 
nongovernmental actors).204 Adding to the complexity of the problem, the question can 
be framed in one of two, albeit somewhat overlapping, senses. On the one hand, the fact-
law problem can be pondered from an internal perspective of normative justification: 
When should an institution’s decisions or judgment be entitled to a normative 
complexion? Why should court’s decisions be viewed as normatively freighted in a way 
that, say, the decisions of many executive branch agents are not?205 On the other hand, 
inquiry might instead turn on the “sociological” question of when specific institution’s 
decisions are accorded wider normative significance as evidence of how constitutional 
questions should be settled.206 The latter, sociological inquiry necessarily turns on 
                                                
200 This is the German title of Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse 
Theory of Law and Democracy (William H. Rehg trans., 1996). Habermas draws attention to multiple ways 
in which the factual order and the juridical normative one relate or come apart. See, e.g., id. at 38 
(identifying an “external relation between facticity and validity” as the problem of “the facticity of legally 
uncontrolled social power that penetrates law from the outside”); see also id. at 82 (identifying the 
“external tension between the normative claims of constitutional democracies and the facticity of their 
actual functioning”). Habermas’s second specification is closest the relevant sense of the distinction here.  
201 Peter J. Lindseth, Between the ‘Real’ and the ‘Right’: Explorations along the Institutional-Constitutional 
Frontier, in Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law: Bridging Idealism and Realism 60 (Maurice Adams et 
al. eds., 2017). 
202 See, e.g., Randy J. Kozel, Precedent and Speech, 115 Mich. L. Rev. 439, 443-45 (2017) (summarizing 
justifications for precedent’s force).  
203 See, e.g., Bradley & Morrison, supra note 16, at 424-25 (exploring justifications for relying on gloss).   
204 See, e.g., Kim Forde-Mazrui, Tradition As Justification: The Case of Opposite-Sex Marriage, 78 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 281 (2011) (exploring the question in the Equal Protection context). 
205 A domain in which this sort of question is encountered and grappled with directly concerns the 
boundaries of judicial deference to administrative agency decisions taken to have the force of law. See, e.g., 
United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 230-32 (2001). A recently contested salient in the question of fact-
norm mediation concerns the scope of Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997), and Bowles v. Seminole 
Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945), which concern agency interpretations of their own regulations.  
See, e.g., Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2166 (2012) (finding Auer deference 
inappropriate “when the agency's interpretation is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation” or 
“when there is reason to suspect that the agency's interpretation does not reflect the agency's fair and 
considered judgment” (internal quotation marks omitted)); accord Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. 
Ct. 1199, 1208 n.4 (2015). But the problem is quite general in character.  
206 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1787, 1795 (2005) (“[A] 
constitutional regime, governmental institution, or official decision possesses [sociological] legitimacy in a 
strong sense insofar as the relevant public regards it as justified, appropriate, or otherwise deserving of 
support for reasons beyond fear of sanctions or mere hope for personal reward.”).  
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judgments about the normative dispositions and attitudes of participants in the legal 
system. But it is easily entangled in (or confused with) the first purely normative version 
of the inquiry.    
 
To the extent that judicial settlement is a scarcer commodity in the separation-of-
powers context than in other domains of constitutional law, this question of fact/norm 
translation assumes greater importance. Questions of when and how stare decisis effect is 
denied to an otherwise valid precedent have familiar solutions in the judicial context.207 
Not so when judicial precedent is wanting.208 There, the question is how to sort through 
the accumulating detritus of history and identify valuable exemplars from the chaff of 
misleading or disreputable examples. There is no generally accepted answer. To the 
extent that the more conventional strand of Chafetz’s case studies rests implicitly on the 
exercise of such a sorting protocol, it is necessarily incomplete. More generally, 
questions of how to traverse the transition from historical fact to legal normativity in a 
constitutional system in which textual sources play a relatively modest role209 will tend to 
be crucial in delimiting the bounds of legitimate sources of law.210 
 
Second, the constitutional politics account raises a question as to how best to 
conceptualize the boundaries of law. It is intuitive to frame the matter of sources of law 
as a binary one: Either something counts or it does not. But there is no a priori reason 
such an impermeable boundary should be taken as given. British constitutional theorists 
have long employed a concept of “convention” to capture a more fluid idea of law’s 
boundaries. Hence, A.V. Dicey identified “conventions, understandings, habits, or 
practices which, though they may regulate the conduct of the several members of the 
sovereign power . . . are not in reality laws at all since they are not enforced by the 
Courts.”211 Conventions, as matters of “constitutional morality,” nevertheless played a 
central structural role in the British constitution system by determining “the way in which 
the prerogative powers of the Crown (and therefore of ministers) were exercised in 
practice.”212 American legal scholars have begun of late to consider the role that such an 
analogous conception might play in U.S. constitutional law, albeit without the structural 
                                                
207 For a seminal discussion, see Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 
Colum. L. Rev. 723, 757-58 (1988).  
208 Bradley and Morrison, however, recognize and explore the question in relation to historical gloss. See 
Bradley & Morrison, supra note 16, at 424 (“Any practice- or precedent-based approach naturally must 
confront questions about how to specify the scope of the past practice or precedent.”). 
209 Cf. David A. Strauss, Foreword: Does the Constitution Mean What It Says?, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 3 
(2015) (“If we read the text of the Constitution in a straightforward way, American constitutional law 
“contradicts” the text of the Constitution more often than one might think.”).  
210 A related question that has not received as much attention as I think it deserves is whether and how the 
protocol for determining when historical facts about one branch’s behavior should be presumed to be 
identical to, or different from, the protocol for a different branch. One might, for example, ask whether the 
reception conditions for historical gloss and judicial precedent should systematically diverge. Cf. Bradley 
& Morrison, supra note 16, at 427-28.  
211 A. V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 22-23 (8th ed. 1915).  
212 Geoffrey Marshall, What are Constitutional Conventions?, 38 Parliamentary Aff. 33, 33 (1985).  
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functionality of conventions in the British context.213  
One way of parsing the ambiguity of the constitutional politics account as to the 
status of past institutional settlements—and perhaps also a way to navigate the path from 
facticity to normativity—is to view the outcomes of past institutional conflicts as 
conventions that are capable of supporting a normative inference under the right 
conditions. Lacking the binding force of law but distinct from the epiphenomenal spume 
of daily partisan conflict, such conventions reflect a shallow, primitive judgment about 
the valence of some, but not all, historical facts based on the practical morality of daily 
practice. Navigating the transition from historical fact to conventionality presents similar, 
but easier, questions as the passage from fact to law. The questions are similar because in 
both instances the theorist seeks to derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is.’ The questions diverge 
insofar as the weaker, peripheral nature of conventions arguably lowers the burden of 
justification needful to making that transition. Appeal to consequentialist justifications 
for lending precedential effect to past practice on the basis of their ability to operate as 
coordinating focal points may be more appealing than they would be in a strictly legal 
context.214  
 
C. Equilibrium and Change 
 
In the constitutional politics account, is the separation of powers in equilibrium, 
or is it an unstable and dynamic system? More colloquially, is it a theory of institutional 
change over time, or one of institutional stability? Separation and balance theories most 
clearly diverge over this question. Whereas separation theories tend to favor stability and 
the preservation of long-standing understandings of law, balance theories are more 
tolerant of institutional transformation with an eye toward the vindication of more 
abstract, systemic values.  
 
Again, the position of the constitutional politics account is ambiguous depending 
on whether theory or case study is prioritized. As noted, the theory underscores and even 
celebrates “uncertainty, instability, and unpredictability” (pp. 312-14).215 At the same 
time, the case studies, to a noteworthy extent, are fairly legible by the interpretive lights 
                                                
213 Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 1163, 1184 (2013) 
[hereinafter Vermeule, Conventions] (noting, in the context of a more wide-ranging discussion, that 
“conventions may supply crucial context for the interpretation of written laws, and should thus be 
incorporated into that interpretation); Keith E. Whittington, The Status of Unwritten Constitutional 
Conventions in the United States, 2013 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1847, 1855 (2013) (“Constitutional conventions are 
one mode of construction.”).  
214 Cf. Vermeule, Conventions, supra note 213, at 1192 (“In game-theoretic terms, judicial recognition of a 
convention may provide a focal point on which politicians may converge in an ongoing game with a 
coordination component, including sequential or iterated Prisoners' Dilemma games.”).  
215 At its inception, the account also invokes the idea of “intercurrence” associated with Karen Orren and 
Stephen Skowroneck (p. 4). But the critical element of that theory is the existence of institutional orders 
created at different historical moments that overlap each other, leading to a complex accretion of 
institutional forms at any one given model. Karen Orren & Stephen Skowronek, Institutions and 
Intercurrence: Theory Building in the Fullness of Time, 39 Nomos 111, 138 (1996) [hereinafter Orren & 
Skowroneck, Institutions]. Ideas of overlap and intermingling, however, do not figure prominently in the 
theoretical account offered in Congress’s Constitution.  
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of ordinary constitutional jurisprudence as rather conventional accounts of structural 
constitutional law, replete with traditional trimming in terms of both sources and 
attendant normative judgments of a reassuringly democratic ilk.216 To my sublunary 
lawyer’s ear, the case studies provide the more compelling descriptive account. For it 
would be quite surprising if official actors were observed constantly renegotiating the 
rules of institutional engagement, rather than relying on historical precedent to supply 
rules of the road. While imperfect, even considering the effects in medium term, the latter 
are inevitably cheaper than constant renegotiation.217 
 
To reconcile these themes by saying that constitutional history is a mixture of 
stability and change would be to oust theory with unenlightening platitude. One needs to 
say more about what remains constant, what mutates over time, and what forces drive the 
selection of institutional margins into one of these two categories.  
 
An account of equilibrium versus change in the separation of powers context 
might therefore profitably by with specifying the sense in which, and level of generality 
at which, the term “equilibrium” is deployed. The term is, in operation, ambiguous and 
requires a measure of clarification. Political scientists and political historians have 
engaged in useful polemics over appropriate role of equilibrium concepts in theorizing 
the separation of powers, and legal scholars have much to learn from the distinctions that 
have emerged from this work.218 A brief summary of equilibrium concepts as deployed in 
respect to institutional questions suggests that the dominant approaches might provide 
clues, but are not well suited to direct transplantation into the structural constitutional 
context. 
 
Within the political economy literature, two concepts of equilibrium are common: 
“preference-induced equilibrium” and “structure-induced equilibrium.”219 The former 
arises when “[a]n outcome, x, is [stable] if there existed no y preferred to it by a decisive 
coalition of agents.”220 By contrast, the latter is an arrangement “that is invulnerable in 
the sense that no other alternative, allowed by the rules of procedure, is preferred by all 
the individuals, structural units, and coalitions, that possess distinctive veto or voting 
power.”221 At its core, the first focuses directly on preferences; the second analyzes 
preferences within a given institutional context. In both theories, change to the 
institutional circumstances of choice is modeled as “episodic and homeostatic—a 
momentary transition between states.”222 In this fashion, they “effectively remove time” 
                                                
216 See supra text accompanying notes 195 to 196.   
217 For a similar point, see Levinson, Parchment and Politics, supra note 72, at 695 (2011) (“The 
coordination advantages of bundling multiple (probabilistic) policy decisions into a single institutional 
decisionmaking process are obvious.”).  
218 For a useful account of the disputes, see Orren & Skowronek, Institutions, supra note 215, at 124-39.   
219 Kenneth A. Shepsle, Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions, in Political Science: The 
Science of Politics 51 (Herbert F. Weisberg ed., 1986).  
220 Kenneth A. Shepsle, Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach, 1 J. 
Theo. Pol. 131, 136 (1989).  
221 Id. at 137. 
222 Orren & Skowronek, Institutions, supra note 215, at 124. 
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from the analysis.223 For the kind of separation-of-powers theory that constitutional 
scholars are interested in developing, which is aimed, inter alia, at specifying the terms 
and limits of acceptable change, this is an unhelpful, even debilitating, limit on the 
analysis.224  
 
Historians of institutional evolution, most notably in the American Political 
Development (“APD”) stream that Chafetz briefly invokes (p. 4), repudiate static models 
of institutional interaction. Time, in their view, is instead, “a construct of the 
intercurrence of institutions” in which “collisions and combinations, the changes and 
cycles, of institutions in their various external relations” must be situated.225 Institutions, 
on APD’s account, have a purpose or mandate, establish norms and rules, assign roles, 
operate within boundaries, and develop “norms and values [that] affect their members,” 
even as the institution itself remains “subject to innovation, redirection, disruption, and to 
all manner of personal motives of individuals.”226  
 
An acute, and accurate, implication of such models is the futility of strictly static 
equilibrium analysis of the several branches. But it is hard to see how this strand of 
theorizing can provide a firm foundation for normative theorizing about whether a given 
status quo is desirable in comparison to imaginable alternatives. Nor is it clear how the 
theory can be used to sort among different historical conceptions of institutional form, 
labeling some as licit, and others as undesirable. Absent any guidance on when a status 
quo is desirable, such theories merely predict change without attaching positive or 
negative valence to its various forms. As I have suggested in reference to the 
constitutional politics account, APD supplies no basis for judgment about the present or 
potential futures.227 To the contrary, one might worry that any judgment about the 
practical entailments of an institutional change could be made only in the longue durée, 
one in which we still await a final reckoning on the French Revolution as well as its sister 
revolt on the other side of the Atlantic.  
 
                                                
223 Id. at 125. 
224 One exception is Mittal & Weingast, Self-Enforcing Constitutions, supra note 132. Squarely confronting 
the intertemporal question, Mittal and Weingast argue that a constitution will be self-enforcing if “at a 
given moment, all actors find it in their interests to adhere to the constitutional rules, and as circumstances 
change, they must be able to adapt policies and institutions to maintain that system over time.” Id. at 282.  
Constitutions create “focal procedural and substantive limits” in order to enable popular enforcement, but 
also create “incentives [for officials] to search for and create solutions to new and pressing problems.” Id. 
at 286. Whereas these conditions might be understood as plausible enough general and abstract statements 
of the circumstances of democratic constitutional stability, it is hard to see how they facilitate the 
specification of particular structural design margins. Rather, I read Mittal and Weingast to instruct 
constitution-makers to create some provisions that don’t change, which are acceptable to enough people, 
and also to enable other provisions to change if and when needed. All well and good—but also easier said 
than done.  
225 Orren & Skowronek, Institutions, supra note 215, at 141, 143.   
226 Orren & Skowronek, Search for American, supra note 132, at 82. For a helpful gloss on this passage, see 
Pamela Brandwein, Law and American Political Development, 7 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 187, 188 (2011). 
227 Since historians do not aspire to such normative judgments as outputs from their work, this cannot be 
taken as a criticism.   
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Legal scholars have successfully deployed APD’s account of institutions as a 
means of understanding historical periods of institutional conflict. It is less clear how a 
normative theory of the separation of powers can be articulated on its basis. Some 
exogenous criterion must be invoked as support for normative judgments about which 
historical settlements are legitimate, and which should be abandoned—as Congress’s 
Constitution, perhaps inadvertently, demonstrates. The theoretical compass that can draw 
a “circle just”228 to draw together the arcs of needful stability and healthy institutional 




Theorizing the separation of powers entails an effort to reason from observed 
facts and accepted norms to prescriptions about how state power should be parceled out 
across the federal government. Attention to metatheoretical questions in separation-of-
powers law—i.e., the theoretical assumptions about empirical regularities and normative 
judgments that serve as needful scaffolding to the theory—helps flush out questions of 
lingering difficulty in this enterprise. If the constitutional politics account offered by 
Chafetz does not fully surmount those difficulties, it is not for want of sophistication or 
ambition. To the contrary, the fact that his account grapples explicitly with the core 
difficulties of theorizing the separation of powers is to its large credit.    
 
The first metatheoretical problem to pose a difficulty in separation-of-powers 
theory generally is the question of motives. How ‘branches’ as composites behave 
depends on the motives of institutionally pivotal actors.229 Yet motives are mutative over 
time and across branches, as well as being endogenous to institutional design decisions. 
Assumptions that one particular kind of motivation (e.g., ideological or re-election 
focused) dominates are implausible as a ground for prescription. But—as the limits of 
Chafetz’s account demonstrates—it is quite difficult to build a theory on the shifting 
sands of motivational agnosticism. If, for example, congressional behavior is best 
characterized by “its flexibility, its variety, its capacity to turn on a dime,”230 the 
challenge of normative theorization seeking to identify optimal institutional bounds, 
stable interbranch equilibria, or welfare-maximizing arrangements only grows.231  
The second metatheoretical inquiry implicates the choice of sources of law in a 
domain in which text is (perhaps as usual) indeterminate while evidence of historical 
practice overflows. I have suggested that a theory of the separation of powers must 
engage with several questions, beginning with a clarification of the extent to which the 
label of ‘law’ as opposed to ‘conventions’ or ‘politics’ is appropriate. To the extent either 
                                                
228 Cf. John Donne, Selected Poems 54-55 (John Hayward, ed., 1950). 
229 Note that in the legislative context in particular, collective action problems arise, and are typically 
overcome by cameral rules, which concentrate agenda-setting and deliberation-structuring authority in a 
small number of actors. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress is a ‘They,’ Not an ‘It’: Legislative Intent as 
Oxymoron, 12 Int’l. J. L. & Econ. 239 (1992). 
230 Mayhew, Imprint of Congress, supra note 178, at 99.  
231 The research agenda suggested by Magill—which would resist the urge to transhistorical and cross-
institutional generalization—escapes this problem. See Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches, supra note 
68, at 659.   
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law or convention has been identified on the basis of historical fact (e.g., past practice, or 
a specific decision), the further question arises of criteria for navigating from fact to legal 
norm. Different species of historical facts (e.g., a judicial decision, a statute, a 
congressional committee report, an executive decision to launch an overseas military 
action) might be subject to different criteria to ascertain their normative fright—but then 
some account of the ensuing interbranch differences seems warranted. At best, the cream 
of current scholarship offers a series of partial equilibrium models on these points, with 
no Walrusian general equilibrium in sight.  
 
The final metatheoretical question concerns the extent of stability versus change 
in interbranch relations. Separation and balance theories are distinguished by the different 
levels of generality at which they answer this question. They are united insofar as neither 
explains why the institutions they sketch would honor those equilibriums once they are 
set off and running in the live space of political contestation. Political economy’s account 
of institutional institution provides no help on this front. The constitutional politics 
account instead draws fruitful on APD’s richer toolkit of institutional intercurrence. But 
whatever the gain in descriptive accuracy, there is a loss in normative traction. 
Ultimately, efforts to theorize the separation of powers must grapple with the difficult 
question of how the law can create a set of institutions for the conduct of national politics 
that simultaneously remain stable but also responsive to the inevitable efforts of different 
political coalitions to refashion the inchoate and underspecified terms of political 
engagement.   
 
It must do so, moreover, while remaining alive to the possibility that past stability 
is an unreliable guide to future performance. In constitutional law, like the political life it 
regulates, there are no firm guarantees. Theories of the separation of powers that embed 
optimistic metatheoretical assumptions about the extent of systemic stability, the 
certainty and force of law, and the predominance of benign motives merit especially 
careful and critical handling at a moment when the trajectory of our chief national 
institutions appears uncertain and up for grabs.232 In Congress’s Constitution, citizens and 
scholars are who committed to maintaining the best historical legacies our Constitution as 
a vehicle for decent and civilized conversation and settlement have an invaluable and 




                                                
232 For a more plenary rehearsal of worries on this front, see Tom Ginsburg & Aziz Z. Huq, How to Lose a 
Constitutional Democracy, 65 UCLA L. Rev. -- (forthcoming 2018).  
